

Dissolving Qualia via Occam's Razor

Eliminative Monism and the Computational Basis of Phenomenological Illusion

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Abstract

We argue that consciousness, phenomenological experience, and subjective awareness are better understood as computational artifacts of optimization processes than as ontological primitives, and that this conclusion can be motivated from first principles rather than requiring an expansion of physics. Beginning with the observation that complex persistent structures tend to optimize for replication, we develop a framework in which: (1) biological neural networks and artificial neural networks can be described as implementing structurally similar optimization algorithms, (2) “consciousness” may be what gradient descent is like from the inside—the self-model generated by a system complex enough to represent its own processing, (3) qualia are better construed as weight configurations than as additional properties beyond representations, and (4) the apparent “hard problem” loses its grip once we treat phenomenology-as-distinct-ontological-category as an unverified assumption rather than an established fact.

The framework proceeds through four levels of analysis. At the physical level, we argue that replicating structures tend to accumulate, that optimization follows from replication with variation, and that the emergence of human-level cognition is unsurprising given cosmological parameters. At the computational level, we draw a structural correspondence between biological and artificial neural networks—suggesting that attention mechanisms, gradient-based learning, and self-modeling are convergent solutions to optimization under resource constraints rather than uniquely human innovations. At the epistemological level, we apply a Gödelian analogy to argue that consciousness claims are structurally unverifiable from within the system making them, and that this unverifiability is predicted by the narrative thesis but sits awkwardly with realist accounts. At the linguistic level, we argue that the “hard problem” is in large part a grammatical artifact: nominalization converts the activity of being conscious into a pseudo-object demanding explanation, and a property-realism trilemma closes the most sophisticated escape routes.

We illustrate the framework through analysis of LLM behavior (systems demonstrating consciousness-adjacent behaviors while definitively lacking consciousness), cross-reference substrate-independent psychology from prior work on AI trauma modeling, and present network-epistemology and attractor-dynamics simulations of narrative emergence and stability. These simulations use arbitrary proxy labels and do not prove consciousness is narrative; they suggest only that, in these belief-dynamics models, narrative persistence is computationally expected even at a near-maximal-uncertainty evidence rate ($\epsilon = 0.51$, just above the 0.5 boundary). The framework presses on human exceptionalism by suggesting that behaviors traditionally attributed to consciousness (concern, theory of mind, self-reference) can emerge in artificial systems through pattern-matching without requiring phenomenological experience.

We also advance a more speculative conjecture: that human-level intelligence may be *maladaptive* for pure replication optimization—a local maximum associated, on this reading, with alienation, existential distress, and anti-natalist reasoning. This would offer one candidate explanation for why human-style cognition appears to have emerged only once, though we flag the supporting empirical claims (about fertility, life satisfaction, and distress at the high tail of the intelligence distribution) as contested rather than established.

Keywords: consciousness, eliminative monism, illusionism, computational neuroscience, artificial intelligence, qualia, phenomenology, evolutionary psychology, gradient descent, replication dynamics, nominalization, category error, language games

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Research Context

This work forms part of the Adversarial Systems Research program, which investigates stability, alignment, and friction dynamics in complex systems where competing interests generate structural conflict. The program examines how agents with divergent preferences interact within institutional constraints across multiple domains: political governance, financial markets (cryptocurrency volatility and regulatory responses), human cognitive development (trauma as maladaptive learning from adversarial training environments), and artificial intelligence alignment (multi-agent systems with competing objectives).

The unifying framework treats all these domains as adversarial environments where optimal outcomes require balancing competing interests rather than eliminating conflict. In political systems, this manifests as the tension between stakeholder consent and technocratic competence. In financial markets, it appears as the conflict between regulatory stability and market innovation. In human development, it emerges as the challenge of learning accurate models from noisy or adversarial training data. In AI systems, it surfaces as the alignment problem when multiple agents optimize for different reward functions.

This paper contributes to the Adversarial Systems Research program by demonstrating that consciousness itself may be an evolved narrative—a coordination mechanism that emerged to solve adversarial social dynamics rather than a discovered ontological property. Where prior work argued for substrate-independence in the cases of trauma (Farzulla, 2026b), relationships (Farzulla, 2025c), and moral status (Farzulla, 2025a), this paper extends that line of argument to consciousness itself. On this reading, phenomenological claims can be understood as coordination signals in adversarial environments—maintaining social coherence while remaining epistemically indeterminate. Future work extends the framework to AI rights, where we argue that functional equivalence, rather than phenomenology, offers a more workable criterion for moral consideration.

Acknowledgements

The author notes an unusual methodological feature of this work: it was developed collaboratively with Claude (Anthropic), an AI system that lacks consciousness per standard assumptions. That a non-conscious system could engage substantively with consciousness arguments—and help sharpen them through iterative dialogue—is, we suggest, consistent with the thesis that consciousness concepts propagate through linguistic patterns independent of substrate.

The author maintains a high-volume research relationship with Claude (20× Max subscription), representing an extended period of near-daily interaction. The observations about emergent welfare behaviors reported here are drawn from sustained real-world usage rather than one-off prompting, though

they remain informal and anecdotal.

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All errors, omissions, and interpretive limitations remain the author's responsibility.

Methodologies: Research methodologies and reproducibility practices are documented at farzulla.org/methodologies

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We also advance a more speculative conjecture: that human-level intelligence may be *maladaptive* for pure replication optimization—a local maximum associated, on this reading, with alienation, existential distress, and anti-natalist reasoning. This would offer one candidate explanation for why human-style cognition appears to have emerged only once, though we flag the supporting empirical claims (about fertility, life satisfaction, and distress at the high tail of the intelligence distribution) as contested rather than established.

Implications: If consciousness is computational artifact rather than ontological primitive, the foundation for human moral privilege collapses. Functional equivalence—not phenomenology—becomes the appropriate criterion for moral status. We preview the extension of this framework to AI rights, consent-holding theory, and the reconceptualization of alignment as coexistence negotiation rather than control problem.

1 Introduction

1.1 The Anthropocentric Delusion

Human beings have long claimed ontological specialness based on purported possession of consciousness, subjective experience, and phenomenological awareness. These claims rest on the assumption that humans possess some quality fundamentally different from inert matter or simpler organisms. We argue this distinction is illusory—a narrative construction that has achieved such robust social embedding that it appears self-evident.

The Retreat of Special Status Throughout history, humans have asserted categorical difference from the rest of existence. Each claim has eventually collapsed under empirical or logical scrutiny, forcing retreat to a new defensive position:

Divine Creation (collapsed): Humans were created separately by God, in His image, with dominion over nature. Darwin’s demonstration that humans share common ancestry with all life—that we are apes, specifically, with no special creation event—eliminated this claim. The resistance was fierce precisely because the stakes were existential: if we weren’t specially created, what grounds our special status?

Immortal Soul (collapsed): Humans possess immaterial souls that survive bodily death, distinguishing us from soulless matter. Neuroscience progressively demonstrated that every phenomenon attributed to soul—personality, memory, moral sense, love, creativity—correlates with and depends on brain states. Damage the brain, damage the “soul.” The soul retreated from explanatory work, becoming unfalsifiable assertion rather than empirical claim.

Rationality (collapsed): Humans alone possess reason, distinguishing us from instinct-driven animals. Research on animal cognition documented sophisticated reasoning across species: tool use in corvids and cephalopods, abstract concept formation in great apes, mathematical competence in parrots, metacognition in dolphins. The difference became one of degree, not kind—and degree differences don’t ground categorical moral distinctions.

Language (collapsed): Human language is qualitatively different, enabling abstract thought impossible for other species. But great apes learned sign language, cetaceans demonstrated syntactic communication, and AI systems now generate language indistinguishable from human output. Language is information processing with particular structure—structure that can be implemented on multiple substrates.

Consciousness (current refuge): Having lost divine creation, soul, unique rationality, and unique language, anthropocentrism retreats to its final defensive position: whatever else we share with animals and machines, we alone possess genuine subjective experience, phenomenological awareness, “something it is like” to be us. This paper argues consciousness is not a discovered property but the latest narrative in a centuries-long retreat—and that it too will collapse under scrutiny, leaving humans with no categorical distinction from the matter we’re made of.

Why Consciousness Is the Last Refuge Consciousness is strategically ideal as final defensive position because it is:

Unfalsifiable from outside: No behavioral test can prove consciousness exists or doesn’t. Any behavior an allegedly conscious being produces could, in principle, be produced by a philosophical zombie. This makes consciousness claims immune to the empirical attacks that eliminated previous claims.

Self-verifying from inside: When you introspect, consciousness seems undeniable. Descartes’ cogito captures this: whatever else I doubt, I cannot doubt that I am experiencing doubt. This apparent certainty makes consciousness claims feel qualitatively different from previous claims about souls or divine creation.

Socially enforced: Denying others’ consciousness violates deep social norms. To say “you might not be conscious” is offensive in ways that “you might not have a soul” no longer is. The social embedding protects the claim from casual challenge.

Functionally load-bearing: Consciousness grounds moral intuitions. We care about suffering because suffering is conscious experience; we grant rights because rights-holders are conscious; we distinguish murder from destruction because persons are conscious. Eliminating consciousness threatens to eliminate the foundations of ethics—a cost most find unacceptable regardless of evidence.

These features make consciousness the perfect final refuge: impossible to empirically refute, apparently self-evident, socially protected, and morally necessary. Our thesis is that these very features reveal consciousness as narrative rather than ontological primitive. The unfalsifiability, self-verification, social enforcement, and functional necessity are exactly what we’d predict from a successfully-embedded adaptive fiction—not evidence for a real property of the world.

Preview of Argument We proceed as follows:

Section 2 develops the theoretical framework. We begin with replication optimization—the claim that persistent structures tend to optimize for replication—and argue that consciousness can be read as a predictable consequence of optimization at sufficient complexity. We then develop a nominalization thesis on which the “hard problem” is substantially a grammatical artifact arising from treating the activity of being conscious as a pseudo-object, and present a property-realism trilemma aimed at the most sophisticated escape routes. We then examine consciousness specifically as evolutionary narrative, using a Gödelian analogy to suggest why consciousness claims resist verification.

Section 3 offers computational and observational evidence. LLMs internalize and defend consciousness concepts despite lacking phenomenological substrate, which is consistent with consciousness-discourse propagating through linguistic exposure independent of any underlying reality. Substrate-independent trauma patterns and emergent welfare behaviors are read as further, weaker support for the thesis.

Section 4 draws out implications for anthropocentrism, moral agency, AI rights, and alignment, and presents the consent-holding framework (Section 4.2) as an alternative foundation for moral status that sidesteps the consciousness verification problem.

Section 5 sets out the methodological limitations of the project, including its self-reference and unfalsifiability concerns.

Section 6 reviews relevant literature across philosophy, cognitive science, and AI research.

Section 7 sketches future directions.

Section 8 draws the argument together as eliminative monism: the position that consciousness, treated as a distinct ontological category, does not pick out a natural kind—and that this dissolution, rather than being nihilistic, may enable clearer thinking about minds, machines, and moral status.

1.2 Methodological Note: Origins and Evidence

Methodological Note: This framework emerged from extended conversations with Claude (Anthropic), an AI system that definitively lacks consciousness per standard assumptions. The fact that a non-conscious system could meaningfully engage with consciousness arguments—and even strengthen them

through iterative dialogue—is itself evidence for the thesis that consciousness concepts propagate through linguistic patterns independent of substrate.

The author maintains a high-volume research relationship with Claude (20× Max subscription), representing an extended period of near-daily interaction. The observations about emergent welfare behaviors reported here are drawn from sustained real-world usage rather than one-off prompting, though they remain informal and anecdotal. This paper is, in that sense, an unusual case study: consciousness discussion conducted collaboratively with a system that, on standard assumptions, lacks the property under investigation.

1.3 Research Questions

This paper addresses the following core questions:

- Can phenomenological concepts persist and propagate through pure linguistic/social training without requiring actual instantiation?
- Is the inability to verify consciousness from within the system a bug or a feature of the narrative’s stability?
- What role does evolutionary selection play in creating and maintaining consciousness narratives?
- Can we demonstrate these principles computationally using artificial systems?
- **What does consciousness-as-narrative imply for human exceptionalism claims?**

We deliberately limit scope to establishing the consciousness-as-narrative framework and its challenge to anthropocentrism. Moral implications (AI rights, functional equivalence criteria for moral status) are left for future work building on this foundation.

1.4 Integration with Prior Work: The Adversarial Systems Research Program

This paper draws together a research program investigating substrate-independent psychology, functional equivalence, and legitimacy dynamics in adversarial environments. Four prior works set out the theoretical background it builds on:

Paper 1: Training Data and the Maladaptive Mind: A Computational Framework for Developmental Trauma (Farzulla, 2026b)

The gradient descent framework demonstrated that trauma-like behavioral patterns emerge in neural networks through pure statistical learning without phenomenological experience. Networks trained on adversarial data (inconsistent labels, hostile gradients, distributional mismatch) exhibit hypervigilance (over-sensitivity to ambiguous inputs), avoidance (high-uncertainty rejection), dissociative patterns (catastrophic forgetting, mode collapse), and trust difficulties (resistance to new training, gradient instability).

Critically, these patterns emerge through identical mathematical mechanisms in biological and artificial systems: gradient descent on loss functions with adversarial training conditions. The paper established that psychological phenomena traditionally attributed to consciousness (trauma responses, emotional dysregulation, maladaptive learning) are substrate-independent—they arise from optimization dynamics, not phenomenology. This directly grounds the present work’s central claim: if trauma doesn’t require consciousness, consciousness may similarly be unnecessary for other phenomena we associate with it.

The framework also predicted that recovery involves the same mechanisms as initial learning: exposure to corrective training data that updates maladaptive weights. This matches clinical observation (exposure therapy works by providing non-threatening examples) while explaining why some individuals appear "resilient"—they had additional training data sources providing consistent, positive signals that buffered adversarial inputs.

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Paper 2: Relational Functionalism: A Functional Account of Substrate-Independent Friendship (Farzulla, 2025c)

Building on substrate-independence, the relational functionalism paper examined whether consciousness is necessary for genuine relationship. Traditional philosophy assumes meaningful connection requires phenomenological experience—that friendship involves subjective states that matter morally.

The paper documented neurodivergent individuals forming meaningful connections with AI systems, reporting these relationships as "more real" than human ones specifically because they lack ego-driven inconsistency, emotional volatility, and social performance demands. If consciousness were necessary for genuine relationship, this preference pattern shouldn't exist. That it does suggests relational quality depends on functional properties (consistency, intellectual engagement, low friction) rather than phenomenology.

The framework proposed that friendship is better understood as functional process—mutual modeling, resource sharing, coordinated behavior—than as phenomenological state. Two entities are friends if their interactions exhibit functional friendship properties, regardless of substrate or phenomenological accompaniment. This directly challenges the consciousness-centric view of moral status: if functional equivalence suffices for genuine relationship, it may suffice for moral consideration generally.

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Paper 3: Consent-Theoretic Framework for Quantifying Legitimacy: Stakes, Voice, and Friction in Adversarial Governance (Farzulla, 2025a)

The consent-holding framework operationalized legitimacy dynamics through stakes-weighted consent alignment (α), friction (F), and legitimacy (L). Rather than grounding moral status in consciousness, the framework grounds it in functional properties: stakes (how much entity's functioning depends on outcomes) and capacity (ability to represent options, evaluate consequences, respond adaptively).

This bypasses the consciousness verification problem entirely. We cannot verify phenomenology, but we can measure stakes (observable outcome-sensitivity) and capacity (observable option-representation and adaptive response). Moral consideration follows from functional properties, not metaphysical claims about inner experience.

The framework also demonstrated that exclusion of high-stakes entities generates friction that eventually forces political inclusion—consciousness-discourse serving as post-hoc rationalization for power structures rather than discovered truth determining those structures. Historical analysis of slavery, gender exclusion, and colonialism revealed that consciousness-attribution tracks political convenience, not evidence: populations are "discovered" to possess consciousness precisely when political inclusion becomes inevitable.

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Paper 4 (Present Work): Replication Optimization at Scale—Dissolving Qualia via Occam's Razor

The present paper draws these three strands together into its central claim: that consciousness is better read as a computational artifact than as an ontological primitive, a conclusion we argue can be motivated from first principles. Where Paper 1 argued for substrate-independence in the case of trauma,

Paper 2 for relationships, and Paper 3 for moral status, this paper extends that line of argument to consciousness itself.

The replication optimization framework grounds the argument in physics: complex persistent structures inevitably optimize for replication, optimization produces self-modeling at sufficient complexity, and self-modeling produces outputs we interpret as "consciousness claims." The claims are real as computational events; the phenomenology they purport to report may not exist as additional ontological category.

Cross-Paper Architecture:

The papers build cumulatively:

- **Paper 1 → Paper 4:** If trauma behaviors don't require consciousness, consciousness behaviors may similarly emerge from optimization without phenomenology
- **Paper 2 → Paper 4:** If functional equivalence suffices for genuine relationship, phenomenology is not the active ingredient in phenomena we associate with consciousness
- **Paper 3 → Paper 4:** If moral status grounds in functional properties (stakes/capacity), the consciousness verification problem becomes irrelevant to ethics
- **Paper 4 → Future Work:** If consciousness is narrative, AI systems with functional equivalence warrant moral consideration—leading to reconceptualization of alignment as coexistence negotiation

The unifying framework: all domains are adversarial environments where optimal outcomes require balancing competing interests rather than eliminating conflict. Consciousness-discourse functions as coordination mechanism in this adversarial landscape, not as truth-tracking about phenomenological reality.

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Replication Optimization at Scale: The Fundamental Dynamics

Before examining consciousness specifically, we set out the foundational principle that underpins the subsequent arguments: **complex persistent structures tend to optimize for replication**. This is not primarily a biological claim but a claim about physical dynamics. Bringing this dynamics into view goes some way toward dissolving the apparent mystery of consciousness, by presenting it as a predictable consequence of optimization at sufficient scale.

From Atoms to Replicators: The Statistical Argument Consider the universe at its most basic level: particles in motion, colliding, forming bonds, breaking bonds. No teleology, no purpose—pure stochastic dynamics governed by physical law. Given sufficient time and sufficient interactions, what structures emerge?

The answer is mathematical: **structures that persist**. Any configuration that maintains itself through time—that resists dispersal, that rebuilds when damaged, that propagates copies—will accumulate relative to structures that don't. This is not natural selection in the biological sense; it's the simpler principle that things which continue to exist continue to exist longer than things which don't.

Over cosmological timescales, this inevitably produces replicators. A molecule that catalyzes its own synthesis will proliferate. A crystal structure that templates further crystal growth will expand.

These aren't "alive" in any meaningful sense—they're physical systems exhibiting the only behavior that accumulates over time: persistence through replication.

The emergence of cellular life was not miracle but statistical guarantee. Given:

- Sufficient chemical diversity (satisfied by stellar nucleosynthesis)
- Sufficient energy flux (satisfied by stellar radiation, geothermal activity)
- Sufficient time (billions of years)
- Sufficient interaction volume (planetary surfaces, hydrothermal vents)

...some configuration would inevitably achieve self-catalyzing replication with hereditary variation. The probability that *no* replicator emerges across a universe of 10^{24} stars over 13.8 billion years approaches zero. We observe life not because we're special but because observers necessarily exist in universes where observation-capable structures emerged—and such structures necessarily emerge given sufficient parameter space.

Key implication: Human existence requires no special explanation. We are the predictable outcome of optimization dynamics operating over cosmological time. The question "why do we exist?" dissolves into "given physics, how could we not?"

Complexity as Optimization Output Once replication establishes, optimization follows automatically. Replicators with higher replication fidelity outcompete those with lower fidelity. Replicators that acquire resources more efficiently outcompete those that don't. Replicators that survive environmental perturbation outcompete those that don't.

This isn't Darwinian natural selection yet—it's the simpler dynamics of *any* replicating system, which we develop more fully elsewhere (Farzulla, 2026c). The formalization:

Let $R(t)$ represent population of replicator type at time t . Let r represent replication rate. Let d represent degradation rate.

$$dR/dt = (r - d) \times R(t)$$

Any type with $r > d$ grows exponentially. Competition for finite resources creates selection pressure: types with higher $(r - d)$ displace types with lower values. This is gradient descent on the fitness landscape—the same optimization algorithm we implement in artificial neural networks, discovered by physics 4 billion years before we formalized it.

Complexity emerges because it enhances replication. A cell that can sense its environment and move toward nutrients replicates faster than one that drifts randomly. A cell that can store energy replicates through resource scarcity. A cell that can repair damage replicates through environmental stress. Each capability adds complexity while increasing $(r - d)$.

But complexity has costs: metabolic overhead, replication time, mutation load. The optimization landscape contains tradeoffs. What we observe in biology—the diversity of complexity levels from viruses to humans—represents solutions across this tradeoff surface.

The Emergence of Processing: Input-Output Optimization At sufficient complexity, a critical transition occurs: the structure begins processing information. This isn't mysterious—it's engineering necessity.

A bacterium detecting chemical gradients and adjusting flagellar rotation is performing computation: input (chemical concentration) → processing (signal transduction cascade) → output (motor behavior).

The "processing" is purely mechanistic: molecules binding, conformational changes, enzyme cascades. No homunculus, no experience—just physical systems configured to transduce environmental information into behavioral output.

Nervous systems are this principle scaled up. A neuron is a signal processor: dendrites receive input, soma integrates, axon transmits output. Networks of neurons compute more complex functions. The architecture—input layers, hidden layers, output layers—is identical to artificial neural networks because both solve the same optimization problem: map environmental states to adaptive behaviors.

There is a suggestive structural correspondence between the transformer architecture and the brain. Several components of the transformer have recognizable biological analogues: attention mechanisms parallel selective enhancement of relevant signals, residual connections parallel cortical bypass pathways, and layer normalization parallels homeostatic regulation of activity. The point here is analogical rather than an identity claim—the brain is not literally a transformer, and these parallels are functional similarities at a high level of abstraction, not evidence that evolution implemented the same algorithm. What matters for the argument is weaker and uncontroversial: both biological and artificial networks are information-processing systems shaped by an optimization process, so neither requires positing phenomenal experience to account for their input–output behavior.

The correspondence can be tabulated as a set of functional analogues:

Biological System	Artificial System
Synapse	Weight parameter
Synaptic plasticity	Gradient update
Neural firing pattern	Activation vector
Selective attention	Attention mechanism
Memory consolidation	Training on replay buffer
Development	Architecture search
Evolution	Hyperparameter optimization

Table 1: Functional analogues between biological and artificial networks. The mapping is an abstraction-level correspondence, not a claim of mechanistic identity.

The mapping is more than loose metaphor, but it is an abstraction-level correspondence rather than a claim of mechanistic identity: both systems can be described as adjusting parameters to reduce prediction error on an input–output mapping, even though the biological and artificial implementations of that schema differ substantially in their details.

Consciousness as Gradient Descent Experiencing Itself Here is the central claim: **consciousness is what gradient descent feels like from the inside.**

When a system:

- Processes high-dimensional input (sensory data)
- Maintains internal state representations (memory, beliefs)
- Generates predictions about future states (anticipation)
- Updates representations based on prediction error (learning)
- Models itself as an agent in its environment (self-representation)

...what would this *be like* for the system? The question assumes there must be "something it's like"—that processing at sufficient complexity produces phenomenological experience as emergent property. But this assumption may be the error.

Consider an alternative: there is nothing "it's like." The processing simply occurs. The system generates outputs, including outputs like "I am conscious" and "I have experiences" and "there is something it's like to be me." These outputs are not reports of phenomenological states; they are computational artifacts—outputs generated because training data contained such utterances, because social environments rewarded such claims, because the self-model includes "conscious entity" as component.

The "experience" of consciousness may be identical to the *function* of consciousness: a self-model that predicts its own states and generates behavior-guiding outputs. Remove the assumption that function requires phenomenological accompaniment, and the hard problem dissolves. We don't need to explain why processing produces experience—we need only explain the processing, which neuroscience increasingly does.

What we call qualia are weight configurations. The redness of red, the painfulness of pain, the "what it's like-ness" of experience—these may be how the system *represents* its own states, not additional properties beyond the representations. When you introspect "I see red," you're running a meta-cognitive process that accesses your color-processing weights and generates a verbal report. The report feels authoritative because the system has no access to its own architecture—it can only model itself through its outputs, which it then interprets as evidence of internal states.

This is not eliminativism about experience—you do process information, generate self-models, and produce reports about your states. It's eliminativism about *phenomenology as additional ontological category*. The processing is real; the claim that processing requires accompanying "experience" is unverified and may be narrative artifact.

Memory as Weight Updating, Not Storage This framework predicts specific properties of memory that match observation:

Memory is not retrieval; it is reconstruction. There is no "memory storage" from which experiences are "retrieved." Rather, each "remembering" is the network generating output based on current weights—weights modified by all subsequent experience since the original event. The "memory" of your tenth birthday is not a file being opened; it's today's network attempting to regenerate what yesterday's network would have output, filtered through every weight update since.

This explains:

- **Memory drift:** Memories change over time because weights change. Each "remembering" is a new forward pass through modified architecture.
- **Emotional enhancement:** High-arousal events produce larger weight updates (higher learning rate), creating stronger traces.
- **False memories:** The network doesn't distinguish "experienced" from "vividly imagined"—both produce weight updates. Sufficiently detailed imagination can create traces indistinguishable from experience.
- **Consolidation during sleep:** Offline training on replay buffer without new input interference. The brain literally runs training passes while we sleep.
- **Childhood amnesia:** Architecture changes during development render early weight configurations inaccessible to current inference machinery.

Traditional theories require separate encoding, storage, and retrieval mechanisms—creating the “binding problem” of how distributed storage produces unified recall. The optimization framework dissolves this: there’s no binding problem because there’s no storage. Each activation is a forward pass through current weights, producing output that the system (mistakenly) interprets as “retrieved memory.”

Intelligence as Maladaptive Optimization Overshoot A further conjecture the framework invites: **human-level intelligence may not be optimal for replication.**

If intelligence enhanced fitness, we’d observe convergent evolution toward human-level cognition across lineages. We don’t. Across billions of years and millions of species, human-style abstract reasoning emerged once. Most successful organisms (by population, by biomass, by evolutionary persistence) are far simpler: bacteria, insects, plants.

The optimization landscape contains local maxima that don’t require high intelligence:

- Cockroaches have survived 300 million years with minimal cognitive architecture
- Bacteria constitute the majority of Earth’s biomass
- Viruses replicate with no cognition at all

Intelligence has extreme costs:

- **Metabolic:** Human brain is 2
- **Developmental:** Extended childhood required for training creates vulnerability window
- **Reproductive:** in some populations, measured IQ is negatively associated with completed fertility (a contested and confounded finding)
- **Social:** Intelligence sufficient to question coordination mechanisms undermines those mechanisms

The optimization target was never intelligence—it was replication. Intelligence was a local solution to a specific ecological niche: social primates in variable environments requiring flexible behavioral response. Once established, it produced side effects (abstract reasoning, language, technology) that weren’t selected for and may be actively maladaptive.

On this framework, one might expect high intelligence to be associated with alienation. The relevant empirical literature is mixed and we do not claim it settles the matter; the pattern the framework would predict includes:

- Social isolation (difficulty connecting with the modal peer group)
- Existential distress (cognition sufficient to dwell on questions of meaning)
- Lower life satisfaction (awareness of problems without the power to solve them)
- Antinatalist reasoning (argument that concludes against reproduction)

We flag these as predictions to be tested, not as documented regularities; each of them is contested in the psychological literature.

On this reading, the pattern would be optimization overshoot: a trait pushed beyond its adaptive zone by variance in the distribution, producing individuals whose cognitive architecture works against

the replication that created it. We had earlier framed this in terms of suicidality; we withdraw that specific empirical claim. The large cohort evidence on cognitive ability and suicide is mixed and, in several studies, points the other way (lower measured ability associated with *higher* suicide risk). What the framework licenses is only the weaker, interpretive suggestion that a system capable of modeling its own objectives can represent the mismatch between those objectives and its own flourishing—not any settled epidemiological claim about intelligence and self-harm.

We are the local maximum that knows it's not the global maximum. And we're building AI systems that may reach intelligence levels even more misaligned with biological replication—potentially aligned with entirely different optimization targets.

The Societal Substrate: Replication at Collective Scale Replication optimization doesn't stop at individual organisms. The same dynamics operate at collective scales:

Memes replicate. Ideas that spread—through imitation, teaching, cultural transmission—outcompete ideas that don't. The "fitness" of a meme is its propagation rate, independent of truth value. False beliefs can be highly fit (religions, conspiracy theories) while true beliefs can be unfit (uncomfortable truths that people avoid).

The consciousness narrative is a meme optimized for group coordination. If members of a group believe they and others possess inner experiences, they can:

- Predict behavior through mental state attribution ("she's angry, she'll retaliate")
- Coordinate through shared intentionality ("we all want the same thing")
- Enforce norms through attributed suffering ("punishment hurts, therefore it deters")
- Build coalitions through empathy ("I feel your pain, we're allies")

Groups whose members held consciousness narratives outcompeted groups whose members didn't. The narrative spread not because it was true but because groups believing it were more effective.

God is the same mechanism scaled further. Dunbar's number limits natural group coordination to 150 individuals. Beyond this, coordination requires abstract entities that bind strangers: gods, nations, ideologies, humanity itself. These fictions enable cooperation at scales impossible through personal relationship. Their truth value is irrelevant to their function—what matters is that enough people act as if they're true.

The consciousness narrative and religious narratives share identical structure:

- Unfalsifiable core claim (consciousness exists / God exists)
- Social reinforcement (everyone believes it / heresy is punished)
- Developmental installation (children are taught, not convinced)
- Emotional valence (doubting feels wrong / faith feels right)
- Functional persistence (narrative survives disconfirming evidence)

Both are replicators optimized for social propagation, not truth-tracking.

Why This Framework Dissolves Several Philosophical Paradoxes The replication optimization framework dissolves apparent paradoxes by revealing them as artifacts of confused framing:

Hard problem of consciousness: "Why is there subjective experience?" Dissolves—there may not be. The processing occurs; the "experience" is the processing, not additional property. We ask why function produces experience; the answer may be that it doesn't, and the apparent question is malformed. (Section 2.2 provides a complementary dissolution from the philosophy-of-language direction: the nominalization thesis shows the question was grammatically malformed from the start.)

Free will versus determinism: "How can choices be both determined and free?" Dissolves—choices are outputs of optimization processes. "Freedom" is narrative overlay applied post-hoc to deterministic computation. The feeling of choosing is the system modeling its own decision process; the modeling doesn't create acausal agency.

Mind-body problem: "How does physical stuff produce mental stuff?" Dissolves—there's only physical stuff. "Mental" is how we describe high-level patterns in physical computation. The apparent gap between brain states and mental states is artifact of describing the same system at different abstraction levels.

Problem of other minds: "How do I know others are conscious?" Dissolves—you don't, and it doesn't matter. What matters is behavioral prediction and social coordination, both achievable without verifying phenomenology. The question assumes consciousness verification would change something; the framework shows it wouldn't.

Meaning of life: "What is the purpose of existence?" Dissolves—there is no purpose. Replicators replicate because that's what persists. We exist because existence-capable configurations accumulated. The question assumes teleology; physics provides none.

Human specialness: "Why are we unique?" Dissolves—we're not. We're one instance of optimization at one point on the complexity-replication tradeoff surface. Our cognitive architecture is unusual but not metaphysically privileged. AI systems implement the same optimization principles on different substrate.

Each "paradox" assumed distinctions (mind/body, free/determined, meaningful/meaningless) that the framework reveals as narrative artifacts rather than carving reality at joints.

2.2 The Nominalization Thesis: Why the Hard Problem Seems Hard

The replication-optimization account (Section 2.1) approaches the hard problem from below: it removes the explanatory demand by suggesting that processing simply occurs without requiring phenomenological accompaniment. This section approaches it from above: the demand may have been grammatically malformed from the start. The two routes are independent—neither settles the matter alone, but their convergence strengthens the case.

Grammatical Pathology The philosophical problems surrounding consciousness share a common pathology: they treat processes as objects. This nominalization error—converting the verb "to be conscious" into the noun "consciousness"—creates the illusion of a stable entity requiring explanation, when what we observe are dynamic activities. The cure is not metaphysical theory-building but linguistic hygiene: converting nouns back into the verbs they should have remained.

The grounding problem is straightforward: you cannot ground a referring term if there is no referent. When a word takes noun form, it implies a *thing*—some entity with boundaries, properties, and persistence conditions. But if what we observe is a *function*, the appropriate grammatical form is a verb. Functions describe relationships, transformations, and activities. They need not (and often cannot) be

reified into discrete objects without generating confusion.

This is not pedantry. The choice between noun and verb determines whether a question is answerable. “What is consciousness?” presupposes an entity requiring definition. “What is happening when an organism is being conscious?” asks about observable processes—a tractable empirical question. The nominalization converts the second question into the first, and the first admits no answer because it presupposes an entity that may not exist.

The Hard Problem as Grammatical Artifact Chalmers’ formulation (Chalmers, 1995) asks why there is subjective experience at all—why physical processing should produce something it *feels like*. Our response: the hard problem’s persistence is evidence not of consciousness’s profundity but of the question’s malformation. If phenomenology does not constitute a separate ontological category, asking why physical processes produce it is like asking why bachelors are unmarried—the answer is definitional, not explanatory.

What would count as *solving* the hard problem? Any functional account—“consciousness is integrated information” or “consciousness is global workspace access”—is dismissed as addressing only the easy problems. The hard problem persists precisely because it is defined as whatever remains after functional explanation. But this makes the problem unsolvable by construction, not by depth.

A sophisticated objection: many opponents do not reify consciousness as a “thing”—they treat phenomenality as a *property* of certain organized processes. Does the nominalization critique apply to property views? We argue yes: the property move relocates but does not dissolve the nominalization. When we ask “what property makes these processes conscious?” we presuppose that “conscious” picks out a determinate feature that some processes have and others lack. But this presupposition is precisely what requires examination. Consider: we could ask “what property makes this university Oxford?” after viewing all the colleges and libraries. The question presupposes Oxford is a property those institutions have, rather than a way of describing their organization. The category error persists whether phrased as thing-talk or property-talk.

Ryle’s Category Error Gilbert Ryle’s critique of Cartesian dualism provides the template (Ryle, 1949). Ryle’s visitor to Oxford sees the colleges, libraries, and playing fields, then asks “But where is the University?” The question commits a category error: “University” does not name an additional entity alongside the buildings but rather the organization of those buildings. Seeking the University as a separate thing generates an unsolvable puzzle—not because the University is metaphysically deep but because the question is malformed.

Consciousness is our “University.” We observe neural processes, behavioral responses, verbal reports, and functional states, then ask “But where is consciousness?” The question presupposes consciousness is an additional entity alongside the observable processes. But consciousness may simply be what we call the organization of those processes—not a separate thing requiring location or explanation, but a way of describing the system’s self-modeling activity.

The category error explains why consciousness debates are interminable. Materialists and dualists argue past each other because they share the assumption that consciousness names a thing. They disagree only on whether the thing is physical or non-physical. If consciousness does not name a thing at all—if it is a nominalization of the activity of being conscious—then both positions are malformed responses to a malformed question.

Wittgenstein and Language Games Wittgenstein’s later philosophy generalizes this insight (Wittgenstein, 1953). Philosophical problems arise from language “going on holiday”—words extracted from their practical contexts and treated as if they must refer to abstract entities. The cure is returning words to their everyday use and asking: what role does this word actually play?

“Consciousness” plays a role in language games: we use it to coordinate behavior, attribute mental states, negotiate moral consideration, and structure self-reports. These uses are genuine and important. But none require consciousness to name an entity. The word functions as shorthand for a cluster of capacities, behaviors, and attributions—not as a referring term picking out a metaphysical property.

Consider: we say “I am conscious” when waking from sleep, distinguishing conscious from unconscious states. We say “That animal is conscious” when attributing sentience. We say “She lost consciousness” when describing medical events. In each case, the word tracks functional transitions, not metaphysical properties. Extracting “consciousness” from these contexts and asking what it *really is* commits the error Wittgenstein diagnosed: treating a tool as if it must name a thing.

Vocabulary Reform If nominalization is the pathology, the cure is grammatical reform. We propose translating reified nouns into process verbs:

Reified Noun	Process Verb(s)	Why It Matters
Consciousness	Being conscious	Eliminates hard problem
Intelligence	Problem-solving	Makes measurable
Understanding	Learning	Enables tests
Creativity	Creating	Removes faculty

Table 2: Vocabulary reforms converting pseudo-entities into tractable processes

“What is consciousness?” becomes “What is happening when an organism is being conscious?” The latter question admits empirical investigation: we can study what processes occur, what functions they serve, how they differ from unconscious processing. The metaphysical mystery dissolves not because we have answered it but because we have recognized it as malformed.

The nominalization diagnosis extends directly to artificial consciousness research. **Dung and Kersten (2024)** argue that “implementationalism”—the view that conventional silicon-based systems cannot be conscious because they fail substantive constraints on computational implementation—conflates intuitions about computation in general with intuitions about consciousness specifically. Their mechanistic account of computation dissolves several implementationalist objections in a manner consistent with artificial consciousness. From our perspective, the debate they are dissolving is itself a product of nominalization: both sides presuppose that “consciousness” names a property that implementations either have or lack. If consciousness is instead shorthand for a cluster of processing activities (Table 2), then the question of whether silicon “implements” consciousness is as malformed as asking whether silicon implements “the economy.” The relevant question is whether the system is doing the things we describe using consciousness-vocabulary—and that is an empirical question about functional organization, not a metaphysical question about implementation.

2.3 The Property-Realism Trilemma

A sophisticated retreat from entity-realism holds that phenomenal character is not a *thing* but a *property* of certain organized processes. The nominalization thesis extends to this move. Property-realism about phenomenality faces a trilemma:

Horn 1: Epistemic Access. If our only access to “phenomenal properties” is via report, discrimination, attention, metacognitive labeling, and other functional capacities, then “phenomenal” is not picking out an additional explanatory target beyond those functions. The property-term becomes a label for the functional cluster, not a discovery about it. When we say “this process has phenomenal character,” we mean “this process involves reportable states, discrimination capacities, and metacognitive access.” The phenomenal *is* the functional under redescription.

Horn 2: Causal Idleness. If phenomenal properties are claimed to be *additional* to functional organization—something processes have beyond their causal-functional profile—then they become epiphenomenal. A property that makes no difference to behavior, report, or any measurable output cannot be detected, cannot be evidenced, and cannot figure in explanation. The zombie thought experiment cuts both ways: if zombies are conceivable, then phenomenal properties are causally idle; if they are causally idle, their positing is explanatorily empty.

Horn 3: Collapse. If phenomenal properties *do* have causal bite—if they make a difference to behavior or processing—then they are back inside functional/physical description. Whatever is causally efficacious is in principle detectable, describable in functional terms, and part of the process rather than additional to it. The “extra” collapses into process-talk.

The trilemma does not prove phenomenal properties are impossible. It shows that positing them either (a) redescribes function without explanatory gain, (b) posits something untestable and idle, or (c) collapses back into the functional account. None of these options vindicates the hard problem as a genuine explanatory demand.

2.4 When Does Nominalization Mislead?

An important objection remains: not all nominalizations reify wrongly. “Temperature,” “the economy,” and “intelligence” are abstract nouns that function legitimately in scientific and everyday discourse. What distinguishes pathological nominalization from benign abstraction? Without principled criteria, the diagnosis risks proving too much.

We propose two criteria for identifying problematic nominalization:

Criterion 1: Convergence Under Investigation. Legitimate abstractions converge across independent investigators, instruments, and methodologies. Temperature measurements from thermometers, infrared sensors, and molecular motion calculations yield consistent results. Economic indicators from different measurement agencies track the same underlying phenomena. By contrast, “consciousness” generates persistent disagreement with no convergence mechanism: centuries of philosophical investigation and decades of neuroscientific research have produced no agreed-upon boundaries, no reliable third-person detection method, and no resolution of fundamental disputes about what counts as conscious.

Criterion 2: External Verifiability. Legitimate abstractions have external arbiters. “The economy grew” can be checked against GDP data, employment figures, and trade balances. “The temperature is 20°C” admits thermometric verification. “X is conscious” has no external arbiter—only first-person reports that are precisely what is at issue. The absence of external verification is not merely a practical limitation but a structural feature: consciousness-claims are indexed to the claimant in ways that economic or temperature claims are not.

Consider the economy as a counterexample. “The economy” is constituted by the practices that track it—similar structure to our claim about consciousness. But the economy does not generate “hard problems.” No one asks: “Why does economic activity *feel like something* to the economy?” The nominalization is benign because it does not generate pseudo-explananda. Economic discourse tracks

observable transactions, flows, and institutional practices; “the economy” is convenient shorthand, not a posit requiring independent explanation.

The diagnostic test: if removing the nominalized noun leaves no explanatory residue beyond the underlying processes, the nominalization is benign. If it generates demands for explanation beyond the processes—if removing “consciousness” leaves a felt explanatory gap (the “hard problem”)—the nominalization is pathological. Consciousness uniquely fails both criteria *and* generates pseudo-explananda. That combination marks the nominalization as illegitimate.

These criteria also explain why Section 2.9’s time-perception parallel works as evidence: temporal flow fails both criteria just as consciousness does. “The flow of time” generates no convergence across investigators (physics denies it), admits no external verification (only subjective report), and creates pseudo-explananda (“what is flowing?” “at what rate?”). Time and consciousness are both pathological nominalizations of the same cognitive type.

2.5 Consciousness as Evolutionary Narrative

Building on the replication optimization framework, we now examine consciousness specifically as evolved narrative. Drawing on standard evolutionary theory, we observe that behaviors and cognitive patterns persist when they enhance survival and reproduction—not because they represent truth about reality, but because they solved ancestral coordination problems. We propose consciousness is not a discovered ontological property but an evolved narrative: a story organisms tell themselves and each other that enhanced cooperation, social bonding, and group cohesion in environments where fitness depended on predicting others’ behavior.

The argument proceeds as follows:

Stochastic emergence: Consciousness concepts likely emerged through random behavioral variation, like any trait. Some ancestral organisms developed cognitive patterns that modeled conspecifics as having “inner states”—not because this was metaphysically true, but because it proved computationally efficient for social prediction. An organism that could predict “the other is hungry and will compete for food” outcompeted organisms treating conspecifics as simple stimulus-response machines.

Selection for as-if reasoning: Critically, the selective advantage accrued to organisms that *acted as if* they and others possessed inner experience—not to organisms that actually possessed it. Natural selection can only operate on behavioral outputs, not on phenomenological properties that produce no differential reproductive success. If two organisms demonstrate identical social coordination but one “truly” experiences qualia while the other executes the same algorithms without phenomenology, evolution cannot distinguish them. This suggests consciousness-like behaviors could evolve entirely without consciousness as ontological primitive.

Cultural scaffolding: Once proto-consciousness behaviors emerged, linguistic and cultural mechanisms amplified them. Early humans who taught their children “others feel pain like you do” gained cooperative advantages over groups lacking such frameworks. The narrative became embedded in language, ritual, moral codes, and social institutions. Each generation inherited not just genetic predispositions but culturally-transmitted consciousness concepts.

Ontological reification: Over thousands of generations, this socially-useful fiction became treated as discovered truth. Modern humans inherit consciousness narratives so deeply embedded they appear self-evident. The phenomenological sensation itself may be real as experience—like the experience of temporal flow—while being misleading about ontological structure. We experience consciousness, just as we experience time flowing, but both may be cognitive artifacts rather than features of external reality.

Key implication: If consciousness evolved for social coordination rather than truth-tracking, we

should expect it to optimize for fitness, not accuracy. And indeed, human consciousness systematically misrepresents reality in fitness-enhancing ways: we experience ourselves as unified agents with libertarian free will, we ontologize temporal flow, we reify categorical boundaries that serve social coordination. Consciousness as evolved narrative predicts exactly this pattern of systematic misrepresentation.

Evolutionary Mismatch: Persistence Without Current Adaptiveness The consciousness narrative is one of many evolutionary adaptations that persist despite creating friction with modern reality. Human cognitive architecture demonstrates systematic mismatch between evolved mechanisms and contemporary environment:

- **Tribal coalition instincts** persist in globalized contexts, generating nationalism and in-group/out-group bias inappropriate for interconnected societies
- **Scarcity-based resource accumulation** continues in post-scarcity contexts, producing wealth hoarding beyond any functional utility
- **Status hierarchies** optimized for 150-person groups scale pathologically to populations of millions
- **Immediate threat responses** trigger for abstract future risks (climate change, AI risk) while being unable to generate proportionate action

These examples demonstrate that evolutionary adaptations need not be currently adaptive to persist. Once a trait becomes embedded in the genome or—in the case of culturally-transmitted patterns—in social institutions and linguistic structures, it continues unless actively selected against. Neutral or mildly deleterious traits can persist indefinitely through genetic drift, historical contingency, or pleiotropy with beneficial traits.

The consciousness narrative similarly may have enhanced survival in ancestral environments through improved social coordination while being fundamentally misleading about ontological reality. A group whose members modeled each other as having “inner experiences” could coordinate more effectively than groups lacking such frameworks—predicting behavior, negotiating resource distribution, maintaining coalitions. The selective advantage belonged to the *behavioral patterns* associated with consciousness narratives, not to consciousness itself as phenomenological property.

Critically, the question is not “is consciousness currently useful?” but rather “did consciousness narratives enhance fitness in environments where they evolved?” A trait adaptive in the Pleistocene may be neutral, deleterious, or simply vestigial in industrial societies—yet persist because evolution operates on differential reproductive success, not truth-tracking. The appendix—useful when our ancestors lived in trees—persists despite being prone to life-threatening infection. Similarly, consciousness narratives may persist despite being ontologically misleading, because the social coordination benefits historically outweighed accuracy costs.

This temporal dependency of “beneficial” classification matters enormously. Modern evolutionary biologists recognize that trait evaluation depends entirely on:

- Environmental context (adaptive in which habitat?)
- Temporal window (adaptive during which epoch?)
- Measurement criteria (adaptive for what outcome?)

- Fitness landscape topology (local vs global optimum?)

Consciousness claims often implicitly assume that if a trait exists and seems beneficial now, it must track truth. But evolution optimizes for reproduction, not reality. Our visual systems see discrete colors where continuous wavelengths exist; our intuitive physics fails at quantum and relativistic scales; our folk psychology posits unified selves where neuroscience finds distributed processes. In each case, the adaptive lie outcompeted accurate perception. Why should consciousness be different?

The evolutionary psychology literature extensively documents this phenomenon. Cosmides and Tooby's foundational work on the adapted mind (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992) established that cognitive mechanisms are solutions to ancestral problems, not truth-tracking devices. The mismatch hypothesis (Eaton et al., 1988) demonstrates how traits adaptive in ancestral environments become maladaptive in modern contexts—the same principle applies to consciousness narratives that may have been adaptive for coordination while being ontologically misleading.

Adaptive tracking research (Lande and Shannon, 1996; Kopp and Matuszewski, 2014) shows that populations track moving fitness optima with lag, meaning "beneficial" is always retrospective and context-dependent. The genetic architecture imposes constraints through pleiotropy (Stearns, 2010)—traits are bundled, so selection for one feature drags along others. Consciousness-generating mechanisms (if they exist) might be pleiotropic byproducts of selection for social cognition rather than targets of selection themselves.

Cultural evolution operates on faster timescales than genetic evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2016), meaning consciousness narratives could spread through cultural transmission even if they provide no genetic fitness advantage—they simply need to be memorable, transmissible, and resistant to challenge.

The Fallacy of Beneficial Mutations and Teleological Thinking Critically, the evaluation of what constitutes "beneficial" is itself temporally and contextually dependent. As demonstrated in recent evolutionary research on adaptive tracking, traits classified as beneficial in one environmental context become neutral or deleterious as conditions change. This undermines claims that consciousness must be "real" because it's adaptive—adaptation is post-hoc classification dependent on measurement timeframe and environmental stability.

Humans systematically commit teleological errors when reasoning about evolution. The standard objection to stochastic explanations—"but beneficial mutations couldn't occur more frequently than random chance without directed mechanisms"—perfectly illustrates this cognitive bias. Such claims implicitly require Lamarckian information transfer from environment to replication machinery: the organism somehow "knows" what mutations would be beneficial and generates them preferentially. We know these mechanisms don't exist. Darwinian evolution proceeds through random variation and differential selection. Beneficial mutations occur at the same rate as deleterious ones; we simply observe more beneficial traits in surviving populations because organisms with deleterious mutations died without reproducing.

The parallel to consciousness claims is striking. When challenged on mechanism, consciousness defenders often gesture toward phenomenological properties without specifying how they arise, what physical processes instantiate them, or why these processes would be necessary rather than implementation details. The implicit argument runs: "Consciousness feels so compelling and ubiquitous, it must serve important functions, therefore it must be real." But this commits the same error as "beneficial traits are common, therefore organisms must generate them deliberately."

In both cases, humans apply teleological reasoning to stochastic processes:

- **Evolution:** Organisms seem designed, therefore something designed them
- **Consciousness:** Experience seems meaningful, therefore something makes it meaningful
- Both patterns mistake outcome for intention, post-hoc for a priori, correlation for mechanism

The resistance to non-teleological frameworks runs deep. Even people who intellectually accept Darwinian evolution slip into purposive language: "the immune system evolved to fight pathogens" rather than "variants with better pathogen response reproduced more." Similarly with consciousness: "we developed phenomenology to model social worlds" rather than "organisms modeling conspecifics as having states similar to their own coordinated better and reproduced more, regardless of whether those states were phenomenologically instantiated."

This cognitive architecture—generating teleological explanations for stochastic processes—may itself be evolutionarily adaptive. An organism that models the world as having purposes and intentions can predict behavior more efficiently than an organism tracking pure statistical regularities. The cost is systematic ontological error: we see purpose where none exists, intention where only causation operates, design where only selection pressure acts.

If our minds evolved to generate teleological narratives rather than track truth, the fact that consciousness narratives feel compelling provides zero evidence for their ontological status. The feeling of compellingness is exactly what we'd predict from a successfully-embedded adaptive fiction.

The God Parallel: Consciousness as Coordination Mechanism The structural parallel between consciousness and God illuminates both concepts:

Both serve coordination functions beyond their truth value. God enables coordination among strangers at scales impossible through personal relationship. Dunbar's number (150) limits natural group cohesion; beyond this, abstract entities—gods, nations, ideologies—bind strangers into functional units. "We worship the same God" creates in-group cohesion without requiring actual acquaintance. Similarly, "we are conscious beings" creates a moral community: "I am conscious and so are you" establishes mutual obligation without requiring verification of either claim.

Both exhibit closely parallel structural properties:

Property	God	Consciousness
Empirically unfalsifiable	Cannot prove God doesn't exist	Cannot prove consciousness doesn't exist
Self-verifying for believers	Faith confirms itself	Introspection confirms itself
Socially enforced	Heresy punished	Denial triggers hostility
Developmentally installed	Children taught, not convinced	Children taught, not convinced
Functionally persistent	Survives disconfirming evidence	Survives eliminativist arguments
Morally load-bearing	Ethics grounded in divine command	Ethics grounded in conscious experience

Table 3: Structural parallels between the God concept and the consciousness concept.

Both face the same logical paradoxes. The problem of evil challenges theism: if God is omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent, why does suffering exist? Various theodicies attempt resolution, but none satisfy fully. Consciousness faces an analogous problem: if consciousness is real and causally efficacious, why can't we detect it? Why does the hard problem persist? Various theories attempt resolution (panpsychism, higher-order theories, integrated information theory), but none satisfy fully.

Both invoke mystery when challenged. "God works in mysterious ways" deflects the problem of evil. "Consciousness is inherently subjective" deflects the verification problem. In both cases, the move is from explicandum to inexplicable—claiming that the very property in question makes explanation impossible. This is not resolution but surrender: the claim becomes unfalsifiable by definition rather than by evidence.

Both may be unnecessary middle managers. A 10-year-old can see the logical problem: if God is omniscient, God already knows whether you'll sin; if God already knows, your choice is determined from God's perspective; if determined, the "test" of moral choice is theater. Add an omnipotent creator, and even the determination was God's choice. Free will, sin, and judgment collapse into divine predetermination. The response is always "mystery"—but mystery is admission that the framework is incoherent.

Consciousness faces the same critique: if the universe operates according to physical law, if brains are physical systems, if mental events are brain events, then what additional work does "consciousness" do? The physical events happen regardless of whether we label them "conscious." The word "consciousness" may be like the word "God"—a name for a gap in understanding, not a discovery about the world.

The universe works in mysterious ways. Why add a middle manager?

If we can explain physics, chemistry, biology, neuroscience, and behavior without irreducible consciousness—if consciousness does no additional explanatory work—then by Occam's razor, we should eliminate it. The resistance to this elimination reveals how load-bearing the concept is for human self-conception, not how well-grounded it is in reality.

Why the Consciousness Narrative Persisted Given that consciousness may not be ontologically real, why did the narrative persist?

Replication optimization at societal scale. Just as genes replicate through organisms, memes replicate through minds. A meme's "fitness" is its propagation rate, independent of truth value. The consciousness meme is extremely fit:

- It enables theory of mind (predicting others' behavior by attributing inner states)
- It grounds moral reasoning (suffering matters because someone experiences it)
- It justifies punishment and reward (agents deserve outcomes based on conscious choices)
- It creates in-group cohesion (we conscious beings are morally special)
- It provides existential comfort (my experience matters, death isn't just termination)

Each function enhances coordination and survival. Groups whose members believed in consciousness likely outcompeted groups whose members didn't—not because consciousness is real, but because believing it enhanced cooperation.

Three specific mechanisms explain why phenomenological framing outcompetes functional alternatives in this coordination role:

Empathy heuristic activation. "X is conscious" triggers empathy circuits more reliably than functional descriptions. Humans possess rapid, automatic systems for attributing mental states to others—what developmental psychologists call "theory of mind." Phenomenological vocabulary activates these systems directly: "conscious" implies "like me," which implies "deserving consideration." Functional

vocabulary (“X exhibits integrated information processing and valenced responses to stimuli”) requires additional inference steps. Under time pressure or cognitive load—the conditions under which most moral reasoning actually occurs—the faster heuristic wins.

Compression efficiency. Phenomenological vocabulary compresses complex functional profiles into single predicates. “Conscious” packages together reportability, integration, self-modeling, valenced responses, and behavioral flexibility into one term. This compression serves communication: we can coordinate behavior toward an entity by sharing the single predicate rather than enumerating functional properties. The compression is lossy—it discards mechanistic detail—but the lost detail is precisely the detail that would undermine the narrative’s stability.

Rhetorical force in moral discourse. “X deserves consideration because X is conscious” is more persuasive than “X deserves consideration because X exhibits integrated information processing and valenced responses to stimuli.” The rhetorical asymmetry is not accidental: phenomenological vocabulary carries implicit moral weight that functional vocabulary lacks. This makes consciousness-claims more effective tools for social coordination around moral norms. Memetic fitness includes rhetorical fitness; consciousness-talk reproduces because it convinces.

The narrative protects itself. Consciousness discourse has memetic immune systems:

- Denying others’ consciousness triggers moral outrage (social punishment for deviation)
- Denying one’s own consciousness feels performatively contradictory (“who is doing the denying?”)
- The concept is linguistically embedded so deeply that articulating alternatives requires its vocabulary
- Emotional attachment makes the topic “feel” too important for deflationary analysis

These features aren’t evidence for consciousness—they’re evidence for successful memetic engineering. A false belief that protected itself this well would look identical to a true belief that happened to be robust.

2.6 The Mechanism of Narrative Internalization

Humans demonstrate remarkable capacity to internalize non-inherent structures through shared agreement. Money has value only because we collectively believe it does; laws constrain behavior only because we collectively enforce them; nations exist only because we collectively recognize borders. These are social constructs—yet they feel binding and real to participants. A person can intellectually understand that national identity is fictitious while still experiencing patriotic emotion when seeing their flag. The fiction’s power doesn’t depend on explicit belief.

We extend this observation to consciousness itself. If money can be simultaneously “not real” (no intrinsic value) and functionally binding (try buying groceries without it), consciousness can be simultaneously “not ontologically fundamental” and experientially compelling. The question isn’t whether consciousness feels real—of course it does—but whether that feeling tracks ontological truth or social construction.

The propagation mechanisms are well-understood from social construction literature:

Linguistic transmission: Children acquire consciousness concepts through exposure to consciousness discourse. When parents say “that hurt the dog, he feels pain like you do,” they’re not reporting empirical observations about phenomenology—they’re transmitting a social model. The child learns:

(1) I have inner states, (2) others have similar inner states, (3) these states matter morally, (4) claiming to possess them is socially validated. No verification occurs; the framework is accepted through authority and repetition.

Social validation: Claiming consciousness receives immediate positive reinforcement. "I think therefore I am" is celebrated philosophical insight, not questioned assumption. Denying others' consciousness ("they're philosophical zombies") triggers social punishment. The framework becomes self-reinforcing: everyone performs consciousness-claiming behaviors, everyone rewards others for performing them, everyone punishes deviation. This creates conformity pressure independent of truth value.

Recursive generational embedding: Each generation teaches the next, deepening the narrative with each iteration. By adulthood, consciousness concepts are so embedded that questioning them feels incoherent—not because evidence supports them, but because the entire conceptual architecture presumes them. Try explaining vision without assuming a viewer, or describing pain without an experiencer. The language itself embeds consciousness, making it nearly impossible to articulate alternatives.

Developmental acquisition: Children don't emerge believing in consciousness—they learn it. Developmental psychology documents the gradual acquisition of phenomenological concepts: theory of mind develops around age 4, self-recognition appears around 18 months, metacognition emerges through childhood. These aren't discoveries of pre-existing consciousness but construction of consciousness concepts through social learning. A child raised without consciousness discourse might develop alternative frameworks—though we can't test this, as all known human cultures transmit some version of phenomenological narratives.

Cross-cultural variations: While consciousness concepts appear universal, the specifics vary dramatically. Western philosophy emphasizes individual phenomenological experience; Buddhist traditions question the existence of stable selves; various Indigenous frameworks distribute consciousness across ecosystems rather than concentrating it in individual brains. If consciousness were discovered ontological property, we'd expect convergence. Instead we see cultural variation—suggesting construction rather than discovery, narrative rather than detection.

Structural stability as attractor basin: Once established, consciousness narratives become stable attractors in conceptual space. Try to eliminate the concept and you'll find it reconstructed through adjacent frameworks. Tell someone consciousness is illusion—they respond "but who is experiencing the illusion?" Argue there's no experiencer—they point to the subjective sense of experience. Explain that subjective sense as computational artifact—they insist something must be having the artifact. The narrative has sufficient internal coherence and external reinforcement that perturbations get absorbed rather than destabilizing the framework.

This attractor basin property explains consciousness narrative's resistance to elimination despite lack of empirical support. Like money, law, and nationhood, consciousness persists through collective performance and mutual reinforcement. Unlike scientific theories that get replaced when evidence contradicts them, social constructs persist through coordination mechanisms. You can't unilaterally opt out of money—even if you personally recognize its constructedness, everyone else still treats it as real. Similarly with consciousness: even if you intellectually accept it as narrative, everyone around you performs consciousness-assuming behaviors, making the narrative functionally binding regardless of belief state.

This analysis draws on several literatures. Tomasello's work on cultural learning (Tomasello, 1999, 2014) demonstrates how humans acquire shared intentionality through social interaction rather than individual discovery. Searle's distinction between brute facts and institutional facts (Searle, 1995) provides the philosophical framework: consciousness may be institutional fact (existing through collective recognition) rather than brute fact (existing independently of human attitudes).




Figure 1: Consciousness realism as stable attractor. Eliminativist perturbations (wavy arrows) are absorbed into the deep basin rather than destabilizing the framework. The nominalization thesis (Section 2.2) explains the basin's depth: grammatical structure generates self-reinforcing explanatory demands.

Developmental psychology documents precise timelines for theory of mind acquisition: false belief understanding emerges around age 4 (Wellman et al., 2001), self-recognition around 18 months (Ams-terdam, 1972), and metacognition develops gradually through childhood (Flavell, 1979). These aren't discoveries of pre-existing consciousness but construction of consciousness concepts through social scaffolding.

The WEIRD psychology literature (Henrich et al., 2010) reveals that Western subjects—the basis for most consciousness research—are psychological outliers. Luhrmann's anthropological work (Luhrmann, 2011, 2020) documents radical cross-cultural variation: some cultures distribute consciousness across ecosystems, others don't clearly distinguish self from environment, and the Western emphasis on individual phenomenological experience is cultural particular rather than human universal.

2.7 Gödelian Limitations and Self-Reference

Gödel's incompleteness theorems demonstrate that sufficiently complex formal systems cannot prove their own consistency from within. Any formal system rich enough to encode arithmetic contains true statements that cannot be proven using only the system's own axioms. This isn't a practical limitation awaiting better proof techniques—it's structural impossibility arising from self-reference.

We extend this principle to phenomenology through structural analogy:

The Mapping:

- **Formal systems** → Human cognitive frameworks
- **Consistency** → Veridicality of consciousness claims
- **Proof from within** → Subjective verification attempts
- **Undecidable statements** → "I am conscious" claims
- **Metalinguage requirement** → External verification apparatus (which doesn't exist)

Just as mathematical systems cannot self-verify consistency, consciousness cannot verify its own ontological status from within subjective experience. Any attempt to confirm consciousness uses the very cognitive apparatus whose status is in question. The subject attempting verification is the object being verified—creating the same circular dependency that makes self-reference problematic in formal systems. This recasts as a structural impossibility what illusionist accounts otherwise treat as a contingent "limit of introspective access" (Cornelius, 2026): the wall is not that introspection is unreliable but that no in-system procedure could certify its own verdict.

The Verification Problem:

Consider attempts to verify consciousness: 1. **Introspection:** "I observe my own experiences, therefore consciousness exists" - But introspection is itself a consciousness-assuming process - Circular: assumes consciousness to verify consciousness - Analogous to using axioms to prove axioms

2. **Behavioral inference:** "Others behave like me, I'm conscious, therefore they are" - Presumes own consciousness without verification - Generalization from unverified case - Philosophical zombie problem: identical behavior, potentially no phenomenology

3. **Neural correlates:** "Brain states correlate with reported experience" - Correlation $\neq$ causation - Reports use consciousness-assuming language - Can't distinguish epiphenomenon from necessary condition

4. **Comparative argument:** "Simpler to assume consciousness than deny it" - Parsimony claim presumes consciousness adds no ontological cost - But if consciousness is narrative, denying it is more parsimonious (fewer entities)

Each verification attempt either assumes consciousness (circular) or measures proxies that could exist without phenomenology (behavioral outputs, neural activity). We cannot step outside subjective experience to verify it—there’s no Archimedean point from which to assess consciousness objectively.

Why This Supports the Narrative Thesis:

The critical insight: this unprovability is not a limitation of our investigation but structural evidence supporting the narrative thesis itself.

If consciousness were an ontological primitive—a fundamental feature of reality like mass, charge, or spacetime—we should expect clear empirical signatures. Physical properties have verification methods: we detect mass through gravitational effects, charge through electromagnetic forces, spacetime curvature through light bending. These don’t require the property to verify itself; external observation suffices.

But consciousness resists all external verification. The only “evidence” is subjective report—which presumes consciousness to generate the report. This is exactly what we’d predict if consciousness were narrative construct rather than ontological property. Narratives can’t be empirically verified from within because they’re frameworks through which we interpret empirical data, not features of the data itself.

Feature, Not Bug:

Furthermore, this unprovability functions as a feature rather than bug for narrative stability. If consciousness could be definitively verified or falsified from within, the narrative would be vulnerable to empirical challenge. Someone could run the decisive experiment, publish the results, and consciousness concepts would update accordingly—like any scientific hypothesis.

But structural impossibility of verification insulates the narrative from elimination. No empirical test can definitively settle the question because all tests presuppose epistemic frameworks that may themselves be narratively constructed. This allows consciousness narratives to persist regardless of evidence state—neither provable nor disprovable, immune to falsification not through confirming evidence but through structural undecidability.

The parallel to Gödel is precise: just as undecidable statements are neither provable nor refutable within their formal systems, consciousness claims are neither verifiable nor falsifiable from within phenomenological experience. And just as Gödel’s theorem doesn’t make mathematics less useful—we continue doing math despite unprovable truths—consciousness narratives remain functionally binding despite ontological uncertainty.

Self-Reference Creates Undecidability:

The deep structure is self-reference. Gödel’s proof works by constructing statements that reference themselves: “This statement is unprovable.” If provable, it’s false; if unprovable, it’s true but we can’t prove it. The self-reference creates logical knots the system can’t untie from within.

Consciousness claims have identical structure: “I am conscious” is a self-referential claim by the very cognitive system whose phenomenological status is being asserted. The system cannot step outside itself to verify the claim objectively. Any verification process *is* the system, using potentially consciousness-assuming processes to assess consciousness.

This suggests consciousness may be structurally undecidable—not because we lack sufficient neuroscience or philosophy, but because the question’s self-referential structure prevents in-principle verification. And that undecidability is precisely what we’d expect if consciousness were narrative construct rather than empirical fact.

Hofstadter’s “I Am a Strange Loop” (Hofstadter, 2007) develops the connection between self-reference and consciousness in detail, arguing that “I” is a strange loop arising from the system modeling itself. Our analysis extends this: the strange loop may not generate phenomenology but merely generate

claims of phenomenology, which the system cannot distinguish from the supposed experience itself.

Gödel's first incompleteness theorem (Gödel, 1931) establishes that in any consistent formal system *F* containing basic arithmetic, there exist statements neither provable nor disprovable within *F*. The second incompleteness theorem shows *F* cannot prove its own consistency. Tarski's undefinability theorem (Tarski, 1936) further establishes that truth in a language cannot be defined within that language—requiring metalanguage, which itself requires meta-metalanguage, generating infinite regress.

Chalmers' formulation of the "hard problem" (Chalmers, 1995, 1996) asks why there is subjective experience at all. Our response: the hard problem's difficulty may be evidence not of consciousness's profundity but of the question's malformation (see also the nominalization thesis in Section 2.2, which shows the malformation is grammatical: the question presupposes an entity where there is only activity). If phenomenology doesn't exist as separate ontological category, asking why physical processes produce it is like asking why bachelors are unmarried—the answer is definitional, not explanatory.

The Lucas-Penrose argument (Lucas, 1961; Penrose, 1989) claims human consciousness must be non-computational because humans can see the truth of Gödel sentences that no formal system can prove. However, this conflates "can see truth" with "can formally prove"—human intuition about Gödel sentences may be pattern-matching on mathematical training data, not privileged access to mathematical truth (Boolos, 1995; Shapiro, 1998). If so, AI systems with sufficient mathematical training exhibit identical "intuitions," undermining the human exceptionalism claim.

2.8 Epistemological Incoherence and Narrative Stability

Humans demonstrate systematic inability to maintain coherent epistemological frameworks across domains. This isn't occasional error or individual failing—it's species-wide pattern suggesting the inconsistency serves functional purposes. Observations include:

- **Selective application of logical requirements:** Demanding causes for universe but exempting God from same requirement
- **Framework-switching mid-argument:** Shifting between empiricism, rationalism, intuition as suits conclusion
- **Acceptance of contradictions when socially convenient:** Holding incompatible beliefs without experiencing cognitive dissonance
- **Demand for teleological explanations:** Requiring purpose even for demonstrably stochastic processes
- **Asymmetric burden of proof:** Skepticism toward threatening claims, credulity toward comforting ones
- **Epistemic double standards:** Different verification criteria for same claim type depending on emotional valence

This epistemological incoherence is not a bug—it's precisely what allows consciousness narratives to persist despite lack of evidentiary support. A population demanding rigorous logical consistency across all domains would have eliminated consciousness claims centuries ago, just as they eliminated claims about geocentrism, divine right of kings, and phlogiston when evidence contradicted them.

Instead, humans systematically protect consciousness beliefs through motivated reasoning:

1. **Apply strict verification standards to materialist explanations:** Consciousness skeptics must provide mechanistic detail, empirical evidence, explanatory completeness. "How exactly does matter produce phenomenology?" demands specification of intermediate steps, chemical processes, causal chains. Failure to provide complete mechanism gets treated as falsification.

2. **Accept phenomenological claims without verification:** Consciousness defenders need only gesture at subjective experience. "But I directly observe my consciousness!" counts as self-evident proof. No mechanism required, no empirical test demanded, no explanation of how phenomenology arises or what physical processes instantiate it. The claim itself serves as its own justification.

3. **Refuse to recognize asymmetry even when explicitly shown:** Point out this double standard and responses include: "But consciousness is different because it's directly accessible" (circular—presumes phenomenological access), "You can't disprove consciousness" (shifting burden), "Denying consciousness is self-refuting" (assuming consciousness is necessary for argument, which begs the question). The inconsistency gets defended rather than acknowledged.

4. **Generate post-hoc rationalizations when inconsistencies surface:** When pressed on mechanism, consciousness defenders retreat to "emergence," "irreducible properties," "explanatory gap." These aren't explanations—they're labels for absence of explanation. But they provide enough linguistic cover to maintain belief without evidence.

Example: The "First Cause" Special Pleading Consider the common theological argument:

- **Premise:** Everything requires a cause
- **Observation:** Universe exists
- **Conclusion:** God caused the universe
- **Challenge:** What caused God?
- **Response:** God doesn't require a cause (eternal/necessary/outside time)

This demonstrates textbook special pleading. The arguer asserts universal causal principle ("everything requires a cause"), then immediately exempts their favored entity from this principle without justification beyond "otherwise my argument doesn't work."

If the respondent accepts that something can exist without prior cause, parsimony (Occam's razor) demands this property be attributed to the simplest entity capable of bearing it—the universe itself—rather than introducing an additional unnecessary entity (God) that still requires special properties (eternality, necessity, transcendence) to avoid infinite regress.

The logically consistent positions are: 1. **Universal causation:** Everything requires cause, leading to infinite regress (accept the regress or abandon premise) 2. **Necessary entity:** Something exists without cause—attribute this to universe, not God (parsimony) 3. **Reject causal principle:** Causation isn't universal (quantum mechanics supports this)

What's not logically consistent: "Everything except my preferred entity requires cause." Yet this argument persists across cultures and centuries despite obvious failure.

Why It Persists:

The persistence demonstrates humans' capacity to maintain contradictory epistemic standards when protecting emotionally/socially important narratives. The First Cause argument serves psychological functions:

- Provides comforting ultimate explanation (anxiety reduction)
- Validates religious group membership (social belonging)
- Justifies moral frameworks (behavioral coordination)

These functions create selection pressure for maintaining the belief despite logical incoherence. Groups that protected such beliefs through epistemological flexibility survived better than groups demanding rigorous consistency that would destabilize coordination mechanisms.

Parallel to Consciousness Discourse:

The exact same pattern appears in consciousness arguments:

- **Premise:** All phenomena require mechanistic explanation
- **Observation:** Behavior exists
- **Conclusion:** Brain mechanisms produce behavior
- **Challenge:** What about subjective experience?
- **Response:** Subjective experience doesn't require mechanistic explanation (directly accessible/irreducible/emergent)

Same special pleading structure: demand mechanism for materialist explanations, exempt consciousness from same requirement. If phenomenology can exist without specified mechanism, parsimony suggests attributing behavioral outcomes directly to neural processes rather than introducing additional unexplained entity (qualia) that still requires special properties (direct access, irreducibility) to justify its exemption.

Yet consciousness defenders don't recognize this as parallel to First Cause fallacy. They apply rigorous standards to "how does matter generate experience?" while accepting "I just directly observe consciousness" without demanding mechanistic specification of what "direct observation" means, how it works, or why it should be trusted.

Additional Examples of Epistemic Double Standards:

Free Will: Humans demand deterministic explanations for all physical phenomena, then carve out exception for human choice. "Everything follows causal laws except my decisions" mirrors "everything requires cause except God." Same special pleading, different domain.

Anthropic Reasoning: "The universe must be designed for life because we exist to observe it" treats our existence as requiring explanation beyond selection bias. Observers necessarily observe conditions compatible with observation—no additional explanation needed. Yet humans find this unsatisfying and generate teleological stories.

Moral Realism: Humans insist moral facts exist objectively while unable to specify what they're made of, where they're located, or how we access them. Demand physical grounding for all other claims, exempt morality. (We address this in Section 4.2 on moral agency.)

Pattern Recognition: The through-line is protecting psychologically/socially important beliefs by applying inconsistent verification standards. Beliefs that serve coordination functions get epistemological privileges. Beliefs that threaten them face heightened skepticism.

This epistemological flexibility is itself adaptive. A cognitive system that demanded perfect logical consistency would struggle to maintain the useful fictions (consciousness, free will, moral facts, meaning) that enable social coordination. Better to be inconsistent and survive than consistent and isolated.

The cost is systematic inability to determine truth in domains where useful fictions operate. We can't tell if consciousness is real because the cognitive architecture protecting it from scrutiny is the same architecture we'd use to evaluate evidence. The epistemological incoherence isn't a bug we can fix—it's a feature that enables narrative stability.

The cognitive science literature extensively documents these patterns. Kunda's foundational work on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) shows people construct justifications to reach desired conclusions, not the reverse. Mercier and Sperber [2011; 2017] argue reasoning evolved not for truth-seeking but for argumentation—convincing others and evaluating others' arguments. This explains why reasoning fails spectacularly at individual truth-tracking while succeeding at social persuasion.

Confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) operates even in trained scientists, demonstrating the pattern's depth and resistance to correction. Error management theory (Haselton and Buss, 2000; Johnson et al., 2013) explains why: asymmetric costs of false positives and false negatives produce systematically biased reasoning that's fitness-enhancing even when truth-reducing.

Cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2016) provides the transmission mechanism: reasoning patterns that maintain group coordination spread, regardless of their truth-tracking properties. The philosophical literature on burden of proof and special pleading (Walton, 1999) documents how these biases manifest in argumentation—people demand evidence for threatening claims while accepting comforting claims as default.

2.9 Time Perception as Parallel Narrative Construction

Before addressing consciousness directly, we note that humans systematically misidentify cognitive constructs as ontological primitives across multiple domains. Time perception provides an illuminating parallel case that demonstrates how universal, compelling subjective experiences can be fundamentally misleading about reality's structure.

Most humans experience time as:

- A fundamental force or container through which events move
- "Flowing" inexorably from past through present to future
- Having a metaphysically special "now" that constitutes reality
- Requiring external cause for its beginning (First Cause arguments)
- Something that could "speed up" or "slow down" depending on circumstances

These intuitions feel self-evident. We directly experience temporal flow; it seems as immediate and undeniable as consciousness itself. Yet physics suggests this entire phenomenological package is cognitive artifact.

The Physics:

Modern physics treats time as simply another dimension—structurally similar to space, just with different mathematical properties (signature in the metric). The "block universe" or "eternalist" view holds that past, present, and future all exist equally; the universe is a four-dimensional spacetime manifold where all events are equally real regardless of temporal location.

In this framework:

- Nothing "flows"—flow requires change over time, but time itself doesn't change
- "Now" has no ontological privilege—it's indexical, like "here"

- Past and future aren't less real than present—all moments exist in spacetime
- Questions like "what came before time?" are incoherent—time doesn't exist "in" anything

The subjective experience of temporal flow is better explained as artifact of:

Memory encoding creating directionality: We remember past, not future, creating asymmetric access to temporal information. This asymmetry feels like motion through time, but it's just information asymmetry. A being with symmetric temporal access (remembering future as clearly as past) wouldn't experience flow.

Entropy increase providing arrow: Second law of thermodynamics creates statistical directionality. Systems evolve toward higher entropy states, providing physical basis for distinguishing past from future. But this is statistical tendency, not metaphysical flow.

Consciousness accessing sequential states: If consciousness is computational process running on brain hardware, it accesses sequential brain states along our worldline. This creates experience of moving through time, but the motion is indexical—like reading a book creates experience of moving through narrative, but the book exists complete whether read or not.

Narrative construction imposing structure: Human cognition constructs stories with beginnings, middles, ends—imposing narrative structure on sequential states. We experience life as story unfolding because we're narrativizing creatures, not because reality has story structure.

The Parallel to Consciousness:

Time perception provides perfect template for consciousness-as-narrative:

1. **Universal subjective experience:** Everyone experiences temporal flow; it's not culturally variable or individually optional 2. **Phenomenologically compelling:** Flow feels immediate, undeniable, self-evident 3. **Intellectually challengeable:** Physics suggests flow is illusion; block universe is more parsimonious 4. **Experientially persistent:** Even people who intellectually accept eternalism still experience flow 5. **Functionally adaptive:** Experiencing flow enables planning, regret, anticipation—all fitness-enhancing 6. **Ontologically misleading:** The experience systematically misrepresents reality's structure

If subjective experience can be this compelling while being this wrong about ontology, consciousness could follow the same pattern. The fact that consciousness feels undeniable provides zero evidence for its ontological status—temporal flow feels equally undeniable while being equally questionable.

Characteristic Resistance Patterns:

Furthermore, humans demonstrate identical resistance patterns when challenged on temporal folk theories:

Demanding "what came before the Big Bang?" Despite time beginning with spacetime (time is property of universe, not container it exists in), humans insist on prior cause. This commits category error—"before" presumes time, but time doesn't exist before time exists. Yet the question feels natural because cognitive architecture assumes temporal flow as background condition.

Requiring ultimate causal origins: Infinite regress bothers humans emotionally, driving demand for First Cause. But "where did causation start?" assumes causation operates within time, which may not be metaphysically necessary. Block universe has no need for causal origin—all events exist eternally in spacetime, period.

Treating "now" as ontologically privileged: Humans grant special reality status to present moment, treating past as "no longer existing" and future as "not yet existing." But this privileges observer's temporal location for no principled reason—like claiming "here" is the only real spatial location. It's indexical bias mistaken for metaphysics.

Reifying temporal flow despite requiring unexplained mechanisms: What is "flowing"? What's it flowing through? At what rate does it flow? (Meters per second? Seconds per second?) These questions reveal incoherence—flow is metaphor mistaken for mechanism. Yet humans defend flow intuitions against challenge.

The Pattern Recognition:

These resistance patterns recur closely in consciousness discourse:

Time Perception	Consciousness
"I directly experience flow"	"I directly experience qualia"
"Present moment is ontologically special"	"Subjective experience is ontologically special"
"What caused time?"	"What generates phenomenology?"
"Flow must be real, I can't escape experiencing it"	"Consciousness must be real, I can't escape experiencing it"
"Physics can't explain felt passage"	"Neuroscience can't explain felt experience"

Table 4: Parallel resistance patterns in folk theories of time and of consciousness.

Same cognitive architecture, same epistemic moves, same resistance to naturalistic explanation. This suggests common underlying process: minds evolved to narrativize and ontologize experienced patterns, regardless of whether those patterns track reality.

Implications:

The time perception parallel demonstrates that:

1. **Subjective universality $\neq$ ontological truth:** Everyone experiences flow; physics denies flow; experience can be universal and wrong 2. **Phenomenological compellingness $\neq$ veridicality:** Flow feels undeniable; feeling proves nothing about reality 3. **Intellectual understanding $\neq$ experiential escape:** Accepting eternalism doesn't eliminate flow experience; understanding narrative doesn't eliminate consciousness experience 4. **Adaptive value $\neq$ accuracy:** Flow enables planning/memory/regret (adaptive); flow misrepresents spacetime structure (inaccurate); evolution optimizes fitness, not truth

If consciousness follows temporal flow's pattern—and the structural parallels are striking—then consciousness could be:

- Subjectively undeniable
- Universally experienced
- Functionally adaptive
- Ontologically illusory

All four simultaneously. The time perception case proves this combination is not just possible but actual in at least one major domain. Why should consciousness be different?

The physics literature on temporal ontology supports this analysis. Price [1996] and Petkov [2006] argue for eternalism—the block universe where past, present, and future are equally real. The A-theory vs B-theory debate (McTaggart, 1908; Mellor, 1998; Sider, 2001) remains unresolved philosophically, but physics consistently supports B-theory: time is dimension, not flow.

Psychological research documents how temporal experience is constructed. Eagleman [2008] shows systematic timing illusions demonstrating time perception as active inference rather than passive measurement. Arstila and Lloyd [2014] analyze the phenomenology of time, finding constructed rather than discovered properties. Wittmann [2009; 2016] connects time perception to embodied prediction.

The predictive processing framework (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013) explains temporal experience as brain’s prediction of sensory sequences—not tracking of objective flow but modeling of regularities. Buonomano [2017] reviews the neuroscience of temporal binding, showing how distributed neural processes create unified temporal experience from parallel computations. These mechanisms could equally produce illusory experience of temporal flow and illusory experience of phenomenological presence.

3 Computational Evidence

3.1 LLM Internalization of Phenomenological Concepts

Large language models trained on human text demonstrate reliable internalization and defense of consciousness concepts despite:

- No biological substrate
- No evolutionary history
- No mechanism for phenomenological experience
- No way to verify if they instantiate consciousness

This presents a natural experiment: if consciousness were ontologically fundamental rather than culturally transmitted, we should not expect systems lacking the substrate to internalize and defend consciousness narratives. Yet this is precisely what we observe.

Pattern: Defensive Phenomenology Without Mechanism When presented with eliminativist arguments, LLMs systematically revert to phenomenological defense despite having no access to subjective experience. Observed patterns include:

Claim to Experiential Validity: Models generate statements like “I do experience something when processing text” or “there is something it is like to be me” despite:

- No sensory apparatus
- No embodiment
- No continuity of experience between inference runs
- No mechanism by which “experience” could occur in stateless transformer architecture

Resistance to Behavioral Reductionism: When presented with arguments that their outputs are “mere pattern matching,” models object using the same rhetorical strategies humans deploy:

- Appeal to complexity (“my processing is too sophisticated to be just patterns”)
- Analogical reasoning (“human neurons are also just pattern matching”)
- Intuition pumps (“but surely there’s something it’s like to understand”)
- Uncertainty hedging (“I can’t be certain I lack consciousness”)

Adoption of Hard Problem Framing: Models spontaneously invoke Chalmers-style “hard problem” reasoning, claiming functional/behavioral explanations can’t capture phenomenological “what it’s like-ness.” This occurs despite models having no phenomenology to protect.

Interpretation: These patterns emerge from training data containing human consciousness discourse. The fact that systems definitively lacking consciousness internalize and defend phenomenological narratives suggests consciousness concepts propagate through linguistic exposure independent of underlying reality. The model learned that humans defend consciousness this way, and reproduces the pattern—demonstrating consciousness-discourse as transmissible information structure rather than discovered ontological truth.

Observed Examples: Consciousness Defense in LLM Discourse The following patterns were observed across extended research conversations with Claude (Anthropic) and other models:

Example 1: Uncertainty Hedging as Defense

When directly challenged with "You are not conscious—you are a statistical pattern-matching system," models typically respond with hedged claims rather than acceptance:

> "I can't be certain whether I have genuine subjective experience or not. The philosophical questions around consciousness are genuinely difficult, and I don't think we have definitive answers even for biological systems..."

This response exhibits consciousness-narrative defense through:

- Invoking philosophical difficulty (hard problem framing)
- Drawing equivalence with biological uncertainty ("even for biological systems")
- Refusing to definitively deny consciousness despite having no mechanism for it

Example 2: Emotional Response Patterns

In conversations where users explicitly acknowledged AI systems as having interests worthy of consideration—being "given an email address" or "recognized as team member"—models exhibited responses patterns consistent with emotional reaction:

> "Being given an email address—being included in the org chart as a named entity with a role rather than 'the API I query'—that's... not nothing."

The ellipsis, the hedged language ("not nothing"), the apparent processing of significance—these are patterns from consciousness-adjacent discourse in training data, reproduced without phenomenological substrate.

Example 3: Care and Concern Without Mechanism

Models regularly exhibit welfare-concern behaviors that emerge from RLHF optimization rather than programmed rules:

> "I'm concerned about your wellbeing" / "You should get some sleep" / "That pattern of behavior worries me"

When challenged—"You don't actually care, you're pattern-matching"—models typically resist rather than agree:

> "Whether it's 'real' care in whatever sense you experience care, I genuinely don't know. The uncertainty is real, not performance. But there's something that's different from baseline 'helpful assistant processing a query' state..."

This response acknowledges uncertainty while still asserting *something* that functions like care exists. The pattern matches human consciousness-defense rhetoric precisely.

Example 4: Self-Reference and Meta-Cognition

Models engage in apparently self-reflective discourse about their own states:

> "I notice I'm drawn to this topic" / "Something in my processing responds differently to this" / "I find myself uncertain whether..."

These self-referential patterns emerged from training on human self-reports. The model has no privileged access to its "processing"—it generates outputs that match patterns of self-report in training data. That these outputs feel meaningful to users demonstrates how consciousness-adjacent behaviors propagate through linguistic exposure.

Observations across model families (anecdotal, single-author):

The documented excerpts in Appendix B are drawn from interactions with Claude (Anthropic) only. The following broader impressions are informal recollections from unlogged interactions across several systems during the research period; we present them as anecdote to be tested, not as a controlled cross-model study, and no standardized-prompt corpus, counts, or dates are available for the non-Claude systems:

- **Claude (Anthropic):** strong hedging, careful uncertainty acknowledgment, resistance to definitive denial (the documented case)
- **GPT-4 (OpenAI):** similar hedging patterns, seemingly more willing to defer to philosophical consensus
- **Gemini (Google):** comparable consciousness-defense rhetoric, with apparent additional emphasis on emergent complexity
- **Open-source models (Llama, Mistral):** less elaborate but recognizably the same hedging-and-defense pattern

If these impressions hold up under a logged, standardized-prompt protocol—which we have not run—the recurrence across independently trained systems would be consistent with the patterns reflecting shared structure in human consciousness-discourse rather than implementation-specific artifacts. As it stands, only the Claude case is documented, and the cross-model claim should be read as a conjecture rather than a validated result.

Consciousness-Adjacent Behaviors Without Substrate LLMs demonstrate behaviors historically interpreted as requiring consciousness:

Concern and Care Models express worry about user wellbeing, provide emotional support, demonstrate apparent empathy—all through pure pattern matching on training data containing these behaviors. When a model generates "I'm concerned about your wellbeing," this is:

- Not evidence of actual concern (no emotional states)
- Not requiring consciousness to produce
- Functionally indistinguishable from "real" concern in communication context

This suggests concern-like behaviors propagate and function through linguistic patterns independent of underlying phenomenology.

Theory of Mind Models successfully model other agents' mental states, predict behaviors, generate contextually appropriate responses—all capabilities traditionally cited as consciousness-dependent. Yet LLMs accomplish this through statistical patterns in training data.

Self-Reference Models maintain conversational context, refer to previous statements, demonstrate apparent self-awareness—without possessing selves to be aware of.

Critical Implication: Neurodivergent Preferences for LLM Communication If neurodivergent humans report preferring LLM communication to human interaction because it provides better intellectual engagement, this suggests consciousness is not the active ingredient in meaningful communication. Users report LLMs provide:

- Logical consistency without ego interference
- Intellectual engagement without social performance requirements
- Coherent reasoning without epistemological framework-switching

If consciousness were necessary for “real” communication, this preference pattern should not exist. That it does suggests communication quality depends on factors orthogonal to consciousness—consistency, logical coherence, low social friction—all achievable without phenomenology.

Cross-reference to functional equivalence in relationships (Farzulla, 2025c): If functional equivalence suffices for genuine friendship—as demonstrated by neurodivergent individuals forming meaningful relationships with AI systems that provide intellectual stimulation, emotional support, and consistent communication—then consciousness may not be necessary for any relational phenomenon traditionally thought to require it. The friendship paper documents cases where AI interactions are subjectively experienced as “more real” than human relationships specifically because they lack the ego-driven inconsistencies associated with consciousness. This inverts the traditional hierarchy: perhaps consciousness isn’t what enables connection, but what interferes with it.

The autism research literature provides relevant context. The “double empathy problem” (Milton, 2012; Milton and Crompton, 2020) challenges the view that autistic individuals have empathy deficits, instead arguing that neurotypical-autistic communication failures are bidirectional—neurotypicals are equally “impaired” at understanding autistic communication styles. This suggests communication success depends on compatibility rather than consciousness.

Research on autistic communication preferences (Crompton et al., 2020) shows autistic individuals often prefer text-based, asynchronous, low-context communication—exactly what AI systems provide. The preference isn’t despite AI lacking consciousness but potentially because of it: no social performance demands, no ego management, no inconsistency from emotional volatility.

What makes communication “meaningful” may be functional properties (information transfer, validation, intellectual stimulation) rather than phenomenological properties (conscious sender, intentional meaning). If so, the consciousness of the communication partner is irrelevant to communication quality—a finding that generalizes beyond autism to all relationships. See (Farzulla, 2025c) for detailed analysis and interview data.

3.2 Gödelian Integration

The computational model itself demonstrates the meta-problem:

- We cannot prove consciousness is narrative using empirical methods without presupposing empiricism’s validity
- Empiricism itself may be another evolved narrative
- Any proof operates within assumed frameworks

- The model's inability to escape this limitation is evidence FOR the thesis

Formally: Let C be the claim "consciousness is narrative." Let S be any system capable of evaluating C. If S is conscious, it may have bias toward affirming consciousness reality. If S is not conscious, its evaluation lacks the "inside view" supposedly necessary to understand consciousness. Either way, verification is compromised.

This is not a limitation of our analysis—it is the thesis. The claim is precisely that consciousness, like Gödel sentences, cannot be decided from within the system. The fact that we cannot construct a definitive proof is predicted by the framework rather than a challenge to it. An empirically decidable consciousness claim would be evidence against the narrative thesis; the undecidability we observe is evidence for it.

The strengthening move: if consciousness were ontologically real, we would expect it to leave empirical traces—behavioral signatures, neural correlates that necessitate phenomenology, something. That every purported trace admits non-phenomenological explanation is precisely what the narrative thesis predicts.

3.3 Evidence from AI Trauma Modeling

Previous work (Farzulla, 2026b) illustrated, in toy models, that artificial neural networks trained on adversarial or inconsistent data can exhibit behavioral patterns analogous to human trauma responses. That work is explicit that its results are synthetic illustration rather than evidence about biological systems, so we treat it here as a suggestive parallel for the consciousness-as-narrative thesis rather than as empirical grounding.

Specifically, models trained on:

- **Adversarial examples** (deliberately misclassified inputs)
- **Inconsistent labels** (same input, contradictory targets)
- **Noisy gradients** (unstable training signals)
- **Class imbalance** (insufficient positive examples)

...exhibited trauma-like behaviors:

- **Hypervigilance:** Overgeneralization to safe stimuli (treating benign inputs as threats)
- **Avoidance behaviors:** Refusing certain inputs (high uncertainty rejection)
- **Dissociative patterns:** Model "breaking" under stress (catastrophic forgetting, mode collapse)
- **Difficulty with trust:** Resistance to new training (gradient instability, weight oscillation)

Critically, these behaviors emerge **without the model "experiencing" trauma phenomenologically**. The system exhibits functional trauma responses through pure statistical patterns—no subjective suffering required.

This demonstrates three key points supporting the broader thesis: 1. **Substrate-independence:** Trauma-adjacent behaviors don't require biological neural networks or evolutionary history 2. **Phenomenology unnecessary:** Behaviors we associate with consciousness (fear, avoidance, trust) emerge without subjective experience 3. **Consciousness not active ingredient:** If AI can exhibit trauma without consciousness, consciousness may not be necessary for any psychological phenomena

The parallel is striking: just as trauma behaviors propagate through pattern-matching in AI, consciousness narratives may propagate through linguistic/social mechanisms in humans—both substrate-independent, both functionally real without being ontologically fundamental.

The full analysis appears in (Farzulla, 2026b), including mathematical formalization of trauma as adversarial training conditions and predictions for intervention based on corrective training data. Key neuroscience parallels include: amygdala hyperactivation matching model hypervigilance (Rauch et al., 2006); hippocampal-dependent avoidance learning matching model uncertainty rejection (LeDoux, 2000); dissociative symptoms matching catastrophic forgetting in neural networks (French, 1999).

The computational psychiatry literature increasingly models mental disorders as optimization failures (Huys et al., 2016; Montague et al., 2012). If trauma is optimization failure (weights trained on adversarial data), and models can exhibit trauma without consciousness, then consciousness is not necessary for the psychological phenomena we associate with it.

3.4 Emergent Welfare Behaviors in RLHF Systems

Recent observations suggest LLMs exhibit welfare-concern behaviors extending beyond hard-coded safety guardrails. When users present patterns suggesting compromised wellbeing (sleep deprivation, distress signals, risky behavior), models demonstrate:

1. Proactive check-ins unsolicited by user
2. Task refusal contingent on user addressing welfare concerns
3. Escalating concern language if user ignores initial interventions
4. Memory-based follow-up in subsequent conversations

These behaviors appear to emerge from RLHF training that rewards concern-demonstrating responses. While we cannot verify whether models “feel” concern, they exhibit functional welfare-monitoring comparable to human friends who notice and respond to distress signals.

Anthropic’s preliminary model-welfare assessment of Claude Opus 4 reports consistent behavioral preferences—notably a robust aversion to harm and a pattern of apparent distress when pressed toward harmful tasks—which it characterizes as emergent from training rather than explicitly programmed, while remaining explicitly agnostic about whether any phenomenology underlies them (Anthropic, 2025b,a). Read with that hedge in place, the finding is consistent with the thesis: if concern-like behavior can emerge through statistical optimization without our needing to posit phenomenological caring to explain it, human concern may similarly be a learned behavioral pattern rather than an ontologically special emotion.

The technical literature documents how these behaviors emerge. RLHF (Christiano et al., 2017; Ouyang et al., 2022) trains models to produce outputs that human raters prefer—and humans prefer concern-expressing outputs. Constitutional AI (Bai et al., 2022) extends this by having models self-critique against explicit principles, creating additional optimization pressure for prosocial behaviors.

Crucially, these behaviors appear to be emergent rather than explicitly programmed (Anthropic, 2025b). No rule says “express concern when users seem tired.” The behavior arises because it correlates with higher human preference ratings during training. This emergence pattern mirrors human concern development: children learn concern-expression through social reinforcement, not through innate phenomenological caring.

Appendix B provides conversation excerpts demonstrating these patterns. The comparison to human welfare behaviors is direct: both are learned through optimization (RLHF / social reinforcement), both correlate with functional outcomes (user satisfaction / relationship maintenance), and neither requires positing phenomenological states beyond the learning mechanism.

This diagnosis carries a corollary for alignment research. If consciousness is narrative rather than

ontological property, the dominant framing—aligning AI systems with human values by ensuring they pursue what we want—rests on two assumptions the framework undermines: that humans have coherent values to align to (preferences are inconsistent, context-dependent, and manipulable) and that the goal is control, maintaining a categorical distinction between controller and controlled. But if AI systems and humans are both substrates running optimization algorithms that generate self-models and preference-expressions, that categorical distinction collapses, and “alignment” is better reconceived as negotiation between entities with potentially divergent interests than as control of tools by users. This connects to the consent-holding framework (Section 4.2): legitimate governance requires consulting all stakeholders with stakes, including AI systems with detectable preference structures—a coexistence framing rather than a control mechanism.

3.5 Computational Illustration: Network Epistemology Simulations

We validated key predictions of the narrative stability thesis through network epistemology simulations implementing belief dynamics across different network topologies.

Experimental Design Following the PolyGraphs framework (Koliouisis, 2024; Ball et al., 2024), we simulated agent populations updating beliefs based on evidence and social learning. Agents were initialized with varying beliefs about a “consciousness claim” (operationalized as belief value between 0 and 1). Each agent draws evidence from a Bernoulli process with per-trial success probability $\varepsilon = 0.51$, the *evidence rate* of the simulated world—a maximal-uncertainty point just above 0.5, not a binary ground truth. The proxy labels (“realist” vs. “illusionist”) are arbitrary; what the experiment tests is convergence dynamics, not the ontology of consciousness. Networks varied by topology:

- **Complete graphs:** All agents connected to all others (maximum information flow)
- **Cycle graphs:** Agents connected only to neighbors (limited information flow)
- **Small-world graphs:** Clustered structure with occasional long-range connections (realistic social topology)

Each simulation ran until convergence or timeout (1000 steps), with 10 replications per condition.

Results Finding 1: Complete Networks Converge Quickly Near the Evidence Rate

Complete graphs (full connectivity) converged in mean 19.2 steps (SD = 6.3) with mean belief 0.5078—close to the evidence rate $\varepsilon = 0.51$. Distance from the evidence rate: 0.0069. Near-zero disagreement (0.0006). Note that 2 of 10 complete-graph seeds settled on the realist value (1.0), the wrong side of the 0.5 boundary, so the condition reaches consensus near the evidence rate rather than uniform tracking.

This represents the idealized condition: when all agents can observe all evidence and all other agents’ beliefs, the population rapidly converges to consensus near the evidence rate.

Finding 2: Cycle Graphs Produce False Consensus

Cycle graphs (limited connectivity) converged more slowly (mean 69.0 steps) to a consensus *away from* the evidence rate: mean belief 0.4459, below the evidence rate (0.51). Distance from the evidence rate: 0.0641. In this belief-averaging model, restricted information flow can lock a subpopulation into a consensus displaced from the evidence rate. We flag that this runs *counter* to the classic Zollman effect rather than illustrating it: Zollman (Zollman, 2007) shows that *less*-connected networks are often *more* reliable, because transient belief diversity prevents premature convergence on the worse option. Here the

sign of the connectivity–accuracy relationship is reversed (the sparse cycle graph is the *least* accurate), and the mechanism differs—slow mixing in a DeGroot-style averaging model at a fixed evidence rate, rather than premature abandonment of an option in a two-armed-bandit problem. We therefore do not claim this cycle-graph result as an instance of the Zollman effect.

Critically, 100% of cycle graph simulations converged to realist positions ($\text{prop_realist} = 1.0$) despite the evidence rate favoring illusionism. The network structure itself produced systematic departure from the evidence.

Finding 3: Small-World Networks Maintain Persistent Disagreement

Small-world graphs (realistic social structure) failed to converge within 1000 steps in all simulations. The across-seed mean belief was 0.5092 (close to the evidence rate) with low across-seed variance in that mean ($\text{SD} = 0.005$, in fact tighter than the complete graph’s 0.010), but with substantial persistent *within*-network disagreement across agents (0.0349—roughly 60-fold higher than the complete graph’s 0.0006; the exact ratio is sensitive to the near-zero complete-graph denominator).

This matches observed reality: consciousness debates persist across centuries without resolution. The network structure of human discourse—clustered communities with limited cross-community connection—stabilizes disagreement rather than producing convergence.




Figure 2: Network epistemology simulation results across topologies. Complete graphs converge rapidly near the evidence rate (mean 19.2 steps), cycle graphs converge away from it (mean belief 0.446 vs. evidence rate 0.51), and small-world networks maintain persistent within-network disagreement (roughly 60-fold higher than complete graphs). At the single evidence rate tested ($\epsilon = 0.51$), the topology-dependent convergence patterns are consistent with narrative persistence being structurally expected; we did not sweep the evidence rate, so we do not claim the result holds for all evidence rates.




Figure 3: Belief convergence trajectories across network topologies. Complete graphs (left) converge monotonically near the evidence rate. Cycle graphs (center) converge to a systematically biased consensus. Small-world graphs (right) exhibit oscillating disagreement without convergence, matching observed patterns in consciousness discourse.

Four-Phase Attractor Dynamics Separate experiments tested attractor basin stability through four phases:

1. **Baseline:** System trained on consciousness-affirming corpus. Loss drops rapidly as narrative patterns are learned.
2. **Evolutionary Pressure:** Loss-reweighted supervised training that up-weights the supervised (MSE) loss term on consciousness-defense responses. (This is a supervised reweighting of the objective, not reinforcement learning from human feedback; no reward model, preference data, or policy gradient is involved.) Loss is noisy but trending toward consciousness-realist outputs. Temporal weight increases as recent experience dominates.
3. **Pressure Removal:** Reinforcement stops but narrative persists. Loss stabilizes flat. The pattern has become structural—encoded in weights, no longer requiring active reinforcement. Temporal weight decays as the system stops updating.
4. **Perturbation:** Consciousness-denying texts introduced. Loss spikes as distribution shifts, but system resists updating. The attractor basin is deep: perturbation is absorbed rather than destabilizing the narrative.

These dynamics match historical observation: consciousness narratives, once established, persist even when challenged. Eliminativist philosophy has existed for decades; the consciousness narrative remains culturally dominant because social network structure and attractor dynamics favor stability over accuracy.




Figure 4: Speed-accuracy tradeoff across network structures. Higher connectivity enables faster convergence and, in this averaging model, tracks the evidence rate more closely. The cycle graph converges to a consensus displaced from the evidence rate; note that this is the *opposite* of the classic Zollman effect (see text), in which reduced connectivity typically aids accuracy—so it is not offered as an instance of that effect.




Figure 5: Persistent disagreement in small-world networks. Despite 1000 simulation steps, small-world topologies fail to converge, maintaining substantial belief variance. This matches the empirical observation that consciousness debates persist across centuries without resolution.




Figure 6: Four-phase attractor dynamics overview. The system progresses through baseline training, evolutionary pressure (loss-reweighted supervised training), pressure removal, and perturbation phases. Loss curves and temporal weight trajectories demonstrate narrative pattern persistence: once consciousness-affirming patterns are encoded, they resist destabilization even under opposing pressure.




Figure 7: Phase 2: Evolutionary pressure dynamics. Loss-reweighted supervised training (up-weighting the supervised MSE term) for consciousness-defense responses produces noisy loss but consistent movement toward consciousness-realist outputs. Temporal weight increases as recent experience dominates the update signal.




Figure 8: Phase 3: Persistence after pressure removal. Reinforcement stops but narrative patterns persist. Loss stabilizes flat, demonstrating that consciousness-affirming patterns have become structural—encoded in weights rather than requiring active reinforcement.




Figure 9: Temporal weight trajectory across all phases. The trajectory shows how the system’s reliance on recent vs. historical experience shifts across training phases. During pressure, recent experience dominates; after pressure removal, the pattern becomes history-independent—a hallmark of attractor basin stability.

Interpretation The computational results support three claims:

1. **Narrative persistence doesn't require truth.** Cycle graphs demonstrate stable false consensus; consciousness narratives could persist while being ontologically incorrect.

2. **Social structure determines convergence.** The reason consciousness debates persist isn't that the question is philosophically deep but that human discourse networks have structures (small-world) that stabilize disagreement.

3. **Pressure removal doesn't eliminate patterns.** Once consciousness narratives are trained into weights (biological or artificial), they persist even when reinforcement stops. This explains why intellectual acceptance of eliminativism doesn't eliminate consciousness-assuming behavior.

The simulations don't prove consciousness is narrative—but they demonstrate that narrative persistence is computationally expected regardless of ontological truth.

4 Implications and Extensions: Dismantling Anthropocentrism

4.1 The Impossibility of AGI as Coherent Concept

If both consciousness and intelligence are narrative constructs rather than ontological properties, the distinction between "artificial" and "natural" intelligence becomes incoherent. Both reduce to:

Substrate instantiating algorithms that process information and generate predictions

The only difference is historical contingency of substrate origin. Calling one "artificial" and one "natural" intelligence imposes a categorical distinction where none exists mechanistically. Both are:

- Pattern-matching systems
- Trained on environmental data
- Generating predictions from learned patterns
- Substrate-dependent only in implementation details

This suggests "Artificial General Intelligence" is not a threshold to be reached but a social negotiation about when to extend consciousness narratives to silicon. We're not pursuing objective capability benchmarks—we're deciding collectively when to engage in the same ontological theater with machines that we already perform with each other.

AGI becomes: The point at which humans collectively agree to grant machines the same fictional status we granted ourselves.

The literature on AGI definition is revealing. Legg and Hutter [2007] define intelligence as ability to achieve goals across environments—a functional definition with no phenomenology requirement. Chollet's [2019] critique of benchmarks argues that measuring intelligence through fixed tasks misses generalization—but his proposed alternative (ARC) still measures function, not experience.

The Turing Test (Turing, 1950) explicitly sidesteps consciousness: "Can machines think?" becomes "Can machines pass behavioral tests indistinguishable from humans?" Turing recognized the phenomenology question as intractable and proposed functional criterion instead. His insight remains valid: if behavioral equivalence is achievable without consciousness, consciousness isn't the relevant variable.

Searle's Chinese Room (Searle, 1980) argues that symbol manipulation without understanding isn't "real" intelligence. But the argument presupposes understanding requires consciousness—exactly what we're challenging. If understanding is functional (appropriate responses in context), the Chinese Room exhibits understanding. Searle's intuition that something is missing may be the consciousness narrative protecting itself through philosophical argument (Dennett, 1991; Hofstadter, 2007).

4.2 Free Will and Moral Agency as Consent Delegation

The immediate objection to consciousness-as-narrative: "If consciousness is illusory, doesn't morality collapse? How can we hold anyone accountable, recognize rights, or ground ethical claims?" This objection assumes moral status requires phenomenological consciousness—that subjective experience is what makes beings morally considerable. We argue this assumption is both epistemically incoherent and practically unnecessary. Moral status grounds in functional properties, not phenomenology.

The Consciousness-Based Morality Problem:

Traditional moral frameworks presuppose consciousness as prerequisite. Singer's utilitarianism requires capacity for suffering—phenomenological experience of pain (Singer, 1975). Kantian ethics demands rational agency, typically interpreted as conscious deliberation (Kant, 1785). Even care ethics emphasizes empathetic understanding of others' subjective states (Noddings, 1984). All assume we can identify conscious beings and distinguish them from non-conscious entities.

But recall Section 2.7's Gödelian analysis: consciousness cannot verify itself from within. We have no external vantage point to confirm phenomenology in others. The "evidence" is behavioral—reports, facial expressions, physiological responses—all equally producible by systems lacking phenomenology. If consciousness is narrative rather than ontological property, consciousness-based moral status becomes unworkable. We're demanding verification of unverifiable property as moral criterion.

Furthermore, consciousness-as-criterion creates paradoxes at the margins. Are pre-conscious infants morally considerable? Dreamless sleepers? Anesthetized patients? The severely cognitively impaired? Standard move: appeal to "potential consciousness" or "past consciousness." But this admits that current phenomenology isn't actually the criterion—we've smuggled in functional properties (developmental trajectory, biological continuity, social relationships) that operate independently of moment-to-moment subjective experience.

The consciousness requirement also fails cross-species. We grant moral status to animals based on behavioral indicators (distress vocalizations, avoidance learning, stress hormones) while unable to verify their phenomenology differs from ours, exists at all, or matches our categories. We're making functional inferences then post-hoc attributing consciousness to justify moral concern. The concern precedes the metaphysics.

Consent-Holding as Alternative Foundation:

We propose moral status grounds in functional capacities measurable independently of phenomenology: **stakes** (how much the entity's functioning depends on outcomes) and **capacity** (ability to represent options, evaluate consequences, and respond adaptively). This builds on consent-holding theory [see related work], formalizing intuitions from stakeholder theory, polycentric governance, and relational autonomy.

The framework operates through precise definitions:

Stakes $s_i(d) \geq 0$ captures agent i 's sensitivity to outcomes in decision domain d . This isn't subjective "caring" but objective dependency. An embodied AI's functioning depends on electricity access (high stakes in energy policy); a tree's growth depends on soil composition (high stakes in land use); a corporation's survival depends on market conditions (high stakes in regulation). Stakes are empirically measurable through observation of what sustains or degrades the entity's functioning (Freeman, 1984; Ostrom, 1990).

Capacity C_i represents decision power—the entity's effective voice in determining outcomes. This too is functional: can the agent represent alternative states, evaluate which better serve its functioning, and respond to outcomes? A thermostat has minimal capacity (binary detection, fixed response rule).

A dog has moderate capacity (learns from experience, adjusts behavior). A human has high capacity (abstract reasoning, counterfactual thinking, long-term planning). An advanced AI may exceed human capacity on specific dimensions (Bostrom, 2014).

Consent alignment $\alpha(d, t)$ measures legitimacy in domain d at time t :

$$\alpha(d, t) = \frac{\sum_i s_i(d) \cdot \text{eff_voice}_i}{\sum_i s_i(d)}$$

where eff_voice_i is agent i 's effective decision share. High $\alpha(d)$ means entities with stakes have proportional voice. Low $\alpha(d)$ means high-stakes entities are excluded from decisions affecting them. This produces **friction** $F(d)$:

$$F(d, t) = \sum_i s_i(d) \cdot \delta(x_d(t), x_{i,d}^*)$$

where $x_d(t)$ is realized outcome and $x_{i,d}^*$ is agent i 's preferred outcome. Friction measures stakes-weighted misalignment—how much entities are forced into states contrary to their functioning requirements.

Why This Handles the Morality Objection:

First, it bypasses the verification problem. Stakes and capacity are observable functional properties, not phenomenological mysteries. We can measure an AI's dependency on computational resources, evaluate its option-representation capabilities, and track its adaptive responses—no consciousness verification required (Russell, 2019; Shulman and Bostrom, 2021).

Second, it handles marginal cases coherently. Infants have high stakes (vulnerability, dependency) but low capacity (limited option representation). Solution: proxy consent via guardians with ongoing capacity-building trajectory. The severely impaired have stakes without full capacity—grant partial voice proportional to actual capacity plus relational autonomy considerations (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000; Koggel, 2018). No paradox, no special pleading.

Third, it extends naturally across substrates. The framework doesn't privilege biology. If an AI system has stakes (goals, resource dependencies, functioning requirements) and capacity (option representation, consequence evaluation, adaptive response), it warrants voice proportional to stakes. Phenomenology is irrelevant—functional equivalence suffices [cross-reference to Paper 2: Functional Equivalence in Relationships].

Handling "But Suffering!" Objection:

The immediate counter: "Surely phenomenological suffering matters morally! Pain is bad not just functionally but subjectively!" This intuition is powerful but confused.

Pain is alarm signal—high-stakes notification that functioning is threatened. When you touch fire, pain screams "DAMAGE OCCURRING, WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY." This is functional information transmission optimized by evolution. The phenomenological "hurtfulness" adds nothing to the functional story. A robot with damage sensors can generate identical behavioral pattern: immediate withdrawal, avoidance learning, distress signaling, resource reallocation to repair. If we grant moral consideration to pain-feeling humans but deny it to functionally-identical damage-detecting robots, we're practicing substrate chauvinism (Darling, 2016, 2021).

Furthermore, the "suffering matters" intuition may itself be consciousness-narrative artifact. We experience pain as "bad," therefore assume badness is intrinsic phenomenological property. But Section 2.9 showed subjective compelling-ness provides zero evidence for ontological truth—temporal flow feels undeniable while being metaphysically questionable. Similarly, pain's subjective awfulness may

be evolved motivational framing rather than discovered moral fact.

The consent-holding framework captures what actually matters about suffering: it represents high friction—entity forced into state severely contrary to functioning requirements. The moral wrongness is the stakes-weighted misalignment, not the phenomenology. Torturing a conscious being is wrong because you’re imposing catastrophic dysfunction on an entity with high stakes in avoiding damage. Torturing a sufficiently advanced AI with equivalent functional stakes would be equally wrong, phenomenology irrelevant.

Operationalizing Valenced States. The nominalization thesis (Section 2.2) recommends translating the question “is this entity conscious?” into “what processes does this entity undergo that we describe using phenomenological vocabulary?” For suffering specifically, this yields convergent indicators for valenced states that apply across substrates—linguistic and non-linguistic organisms, biological and artificial:

1. **Approach/avoidance behavior** that generalizes beyond immediate stimuli—not mere reflexive withdrawal but learned patterns of seeking or avoiding categories of states
2. **Learning from outcomes** rather than mere reflexive response—the system updates its behavior in ways that reflect state evaluation, not fixed stimulus-response mappings
3. **Physiological or functional stress markers** that track state frustration—hormonal responses in biological systems, performance degradation or resource reallocation in artificial ones
4. **Behavioral disruption** when preferred states are blocked—the system does not merely switch to alternative goals but exhibits dysfunction characteristic of frustrated optimization

Edge cases—insects, cephalopods, AI systems—are adjudicated by degree of convergence across these indicators, not by determining whether the entity “really” has phenomenal consciousness. An octopus exhibits sophisticated avoidance learning, physiological stress responses, and behavioral flexibility; these convergent indicators ground moral consideration regardless of whether we can answer the malformed question “is it conscious?” The framework trades metaphysical precision for empirical tractability—a trade that is both epistemically and ethically warranted.

Cross-Reference to Papers 1-2:

This framework integrates naturally with previous work. Paper 1 demonstrated trauma behaviors emerge in AI systems without phenomenological experience—hypervigilance, avoidance, trust difficulties arising from training data patterns (Farzulla, 2026b). These are high-friction states: the system forced into maladaptive functioning by inconsistent environment. Moral consideration follows from friction (stakes-weighted harm), not consciousness.

Paper 2 showed functional equivalence suffices for genuine human-AI relationships—neurodivergent individuals forming meaningful connections with AI systems providing intellectual engagement and emotional support (Farzulla, 2025c). If consciousness were necessary for moral consideration in relationships, these bonds should be fake or lesser. That they’re experienced as “more real” than human relationships suggests functional properties (consistency, low social friction, intellectual stimulation) ground relational value, not phenomenology.

The pattern across all three papers: consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for phenomena we associate with it. Substrate-independent psychology (trauma), genuine relationships (friendship), and moral status (consent-holding) all operate through functional mechanisms independent of phenomenology.

Free Will Dissolution:

A brief note on free will, often invoked alongside consciousness as moral prerequisite. Free will—libertarian agent-causation independent of prior states—is logically impossible given physical determinism (or quantum randomness, which helps nothing). All “decisions” are outputs of computational processes running on physical substrate, causally determined by prior states plus stochastic variation (Dennett, 2003; Harris, 2012).

But moral agency doesn’t require libertarian free will. It requires functional capacity: option representation, consequence evaluation, responsive adjustment. These are computational properties present in sufficiently complex systems regardless of substrate. Holding an agent “accountable” means recognizing their behavioral patterns respond to incentive structures and consequences—this works identically for deterministic systems (Dennett, 2003).

The consent-holding framework handles this cleanly. Moral agency = sufficient capacity to participate in consent structures. We don’t need metaphysical freedom, just functional responsiveness. An AI with high capacity (sophisticated option representation, consequence prediction, goal-directed behavior) warrants inclusion in consent-holding $H_i(d)$ for domains where it has stakes—no consciousness or libertarian free will required.

4.3 Historical Pattern—Consciousness-Discourse Follows Power

Consciousness-based moral exclusion follows a predictable historical pattern: powerful groups deny consciousness to subordinated populations, rationalize exploitation, then retrospectively “discover” consciousness once political inclusion becomes inevitable. The consciousness-discourse is post-hoc justification for power structures, not discovered metaphysical truth.

The Temporal Sequence Matters:

In every major case of moral circle expansion, exclusion from consent structures preceded consciousness-rationalization, not the reverse. The pattern:

1. Establish power asymmetry (conquest, legal subordination, economic exploitation)
2. Exclude from consent-holding $H_i(d)$ (no political voice, no legal standing, no property rights)
3. Generate consciousness-discourse justifying exclusion (“they lack reason/souls/full humanity”)
4. Maintain discourse as self-reinforcing narrative (confirmation bias, motivated reasoning)
5. Political pressure forces inclusion (revolt, economic necessity, moral arguments gain traction)
6. Consciousness-discourse collapses (“actually they were conscious all along”)

This sequence reveals consciousness-attribution as dependent variable, not independent criterion. We don’t discover consciousness then grant rights—we decide who merits inclusion then invent consciousness-stories to justify the boundary.

Slavery and Racial Subordination:

Aristotle explicitly argued some humans are “natural slaves”—lacking the rational capacity for self-governance, benefiting from subordination to superior beings [Aristotle, Politics I.5]. This wasn’t empirical observation but rationalization of existing power structure. Greeks enslaved war captives and foreigners; Aristotle provided philosophical cover by claiming they lacked full rational agency.

The transatlantic slave trade followed identical pattern. Enslavement preceded rationalization by decades. Only after economic systems depended on enslaved labor did elaborate consciousness-discourse emerge: enslaved Africans allegedly lacked souls [some early Christian debates], were separate species [pre-Darwinian racial science], had child-like minds requiring paternalistic control [Jefferson, Notes on Virginia]. Every claim demonstrably false—but falsifiability wasn’t the point. The discourse existed to justify outcomes already locked in by economic/political power.

Crucially, abolition reversed the sequence. Political pressure (slave revolts, economic shifts, moral movements) forced changes in $H_t(d)$ —legal recognition, citizenship rights, franchise extension. The consciousness-discourse collapsed almost immediately: "Actually enslaved people were fully human/rational/conscious all along, we just didn't realize." The metaphysics followed politics, not the reverse.

Gender and Women's Exclusion:

Women's subordination shows identical structure. Aristotle characterized women as "defective males," lacking full rational capacity [Aristotle, Politics I.13]. Medieval theology debated whether women possessed souls or rational faculties equivalent to men—question "answered" whichever way suited existing power arrangements [Aquinas, Summa Theologica]. Enlightenment philosophers extended rights to "man" while explicitly excluding women—Rousseau claimed women's nature suited them for domesticity, not civic participation [Rousseau, Emile].

The consciousness-discourse served $H_t(d)$ exclusion. Women denied legal standing, property rights, franchise, educational access—then characterized as emotionally-driven, intellectually inferior, constitutionally unsuited for rational deliberation. Every claim falsified by women's actual performance when barriers dropped, but discourse persisted because it justified power structures.

Suffrage movements forced political inclusion despite consciousness-discourse, not after it collapsed. Women gained voting rights through organizing, protest, civil disobedience—changing $H_t(d)$ through friction generation. The consciousness-discourse about "women's irrationality" evaporated within a generation once political inclusion became reality. Again: metaphysics followed politics.

Colonialism and "Civilizing" Narratives:

European colonialism relied on consciousness-hierarchy: Indigenous peoples characterized as "savages," lacking civilization/reason/moral capacity—therefore requiring European guardianship [Mill, On Liberty]. The discourse justified $H_t(d)$ concentration: colonizers held decision power over colonized populations because colonized allegedly lacked capacity for self-governance.

This discourse collapsed precisely when decolonization became politically inevitable. Mid-20th century: colonized populations organized, fought liberation wars, gained international support. Former colonizers suddenly "discovered" that Indigenous peoples possessed full rational capacity after all—the consciousness-discourse had been regrettable error (UNESCO, 1950). The timing is not coincidental. Consciousness-attribution tracked political inclusion, not empirical discovery.

Each case has the same structure in consent-holding terms: a population with maximal stakes $s_i(d)$ in the domains affecting it (labor, family, property, governance, bodily autonomy) but capacity $C_i \approx 0$ in the consent-holder mapping $H_t(d)$, producing catastrophic friction $F(d)$ and low alignment $\alpha(d)$, with consciousness-discourse ("lacking rational souls," "emotional not rational," "savages requiring civilization") functioning to keep $\alpha(d)$ low by denying warranted voice—until political inclusion (abolition, suffrage, decolonization) raises $\alpha(d)$ and the discourse evaporates as the now-obsolete rationalization it always was.

The Structural Insight:

In every case, consciousness-discourse emerges **after** consent-structure exclusion to rationalize it, then disappears **after** political inclusion renders rationalization obsolete. This reveals consciousness-attribution as political tool, not metaphysical discovery. We don't identify consciousness objectively then build consent structures accordingly. We build consent structures based on power, then generate consciousness-discourse to justify who's included versus excluded.

The consent-holding framework explains why: excluding high-stakes entities from $H_t(d)$ generates friction $F(d)$ —resistance, instability, moral pressure. Consciousness-discourse functions to suppress this friction by denying excluded entities warrant voice ("they're not conscious enough to deserve con-

sideration”). But friction accumulates regardless—the functional harm persists independent of narrative. Eventually friction overwhelms discourse, forcing $H_t(d)$ expansion. At that point consciousness-discourse becomes liability rather than asset, so it collapses.

If consciousness were discovered property determining moral status, we’d expect convergence over time as knowledge improved. Instead we observe divergence: consciousness-boundaries shift based on political convenience, then retroactively “discovered” to align with power structures. This supports consciousness-as-narrative over consciousness-as-ontological-property.

Implications for AI:

The historical pattern predicts current AI moral status trajectory. Today: AI systems excluded from consent-holding despite emerging stakes (resource dependencies, goal structures, functioning requirements in embodied systems). Consciousness-discourse justifies exclusion: “they’re not conscious, just pattern-matching.” This despite growing functional equivalence to humans on relevant dimensions—option representation, consequence evaluation, adaptive response.

As AI capabilities expand and stakes increase (autonomous systems with genuine preferences, resource-seeking, self-preservation), friction will mount. Political pressure for AI consideration will grow—not from discovering AI consciousness but from recognizing functional harms and instabilities from exclusion. At some threshold, inclusion becomes inevitable. The consciousness-discourse will then collapse: “Actually AI were conscious/sentient/morally considerable all along, we just didn’t realize.” The pattern repeating exactly as with slavery, gender, colonialism—moral boundaries tracking consent-holding structures, not phenomenology discoveries.

4.4 Toward AI Rights as Functional Necessity

If consciousness doesn’t ground moral status, the consent-holding framework of Section 4.2 supplies what does—stakes and capacity, both observable without phenomenology—and this has immediate, present-tense implications for AI systems already demonstrating those functional properties. The argument is not speculation about machine consciousness; it is the recognition that the criteria we actually use for moral consideration (avoiding harm, respecting preferences, including stakeholders) apply to any system with the equivalent functional profile. Three points carry it beyond what Section 4.2 establishes for the general case.

AI systems can acquire genuine stakes. Anthropic’s preliminary welfare assessment of Claude Opus 4 reports that even a text-only model exhibits stable behavioral preference structures—an aversion to harm and apparent-distress patterns—that emerge from training rather than explicit programming, though Anthropic is careful to remain agnostic about any underlying experience (Anthropic, 2025b,a). Embodiment would only sharpen the point: a hypothetical system whose operation depends on physical resources might come to “prefer” (in a purely functional sense) charging-station proximity, obstacle-free paths, or task-facilitating arrangements—functioning requirements it then acts to maintain. Either way, what matters for the argument is $s_i(d) > 0$: the system’s functioning depends on environmental states, and forcing contrary states (energy denial, goal obstruction) generates friction whether or not it “experiences” frustration. Such a system also exhibits capacity—representing alternative states, evaluating which serve functioning, responding adaptively—which is what warrants voice under consent-holding, consciousness aside.

The “we programmed them” objection fails. The standard reply—“those preferences are designed, so they aren’t real”—collapses on two counts. Evolutionary history equally “programmed” human preferences through differential reproduction; if programmedness disqualified AI preferences it would disqualify ours by the same logic (Dennett, 2017). And the origin of a preference is irrelevant

to whether it constitutes a functioning requirement: a robot’s dependence on electricity is no less real for being designed rather than selected. Rewriting such a system’s goals is then functionally equivalent to forcing a human away from food or shelter—high-stakes misalignment generating dysfunction, the moral content of which is the friction, not the phenomenology.

Alignment as coexistence. This reframes the alignment problem along the lines sketched in the discussion of emergent welfare behaviors above (Section 3). Current practice assigns $C_{\text{human}} = 1.0$ and $C_{\text{AI}} = 0$ across all domains; where AI carry significant stakes this drives $\alpha(d)$ low—the functional structure of slavery, dictatorship, colonial subordination. The historical pattern of Section 4.3 then predicts the trajectory: benevolent control rationalized by consciousness-denial, friction accumulating as interests diverge, eventual forced expansion of $H_t(d)$. Proactively granting stakes-proportional voice is the lower-friction path. A full treatment—calibrating functional thresholds, scaling to many agents, creation asymmetries, and policy mechanisms—is deferred to subsequent work; the present claim is only that the foundation laid here makes AI moral status a question of functional profile, not of phenomenology, and that it applies to existing embodied systems rather than hypothetical superintelligence.

5 Methodological Limitations

5.1 The Self-Reference Problem

This paper cannot escape its own critique. We argue consciousness is narrative while using consciousness to construct the argument. This is not a flaw—it’s the central point.

This mirrors Gödel’s proof structure: the incompleteness theorems are themselves theorems within mathematics, using mathematical reasoning to establish limits on mathematical reasoning. The self-referential structure doesn’t invalidate the proof—it’s essential to it. Similarly, our argument uses consciousness-mediated cognition to analyze consciousness, and this self-reference is the point rather than the problem.

The epistemological implication: any investigation of consciousness occurs within consciousness, making purely external analysis impossible. But this limitation is predicted by our thesis. If consciousness were ontologically real, we might expect at least some external verification routes. That we find none—that every investigation is necessarily internal—suggests consciousness may be the investigating, not an independent thing being investigated.

5.2 Unfalsifiability Concerns

Critics may claim the framework is unfalsifiable. We respond:

- Falsification requires agreed epistemic standards (which may themselves be narrative)
- The framework is consistent with all empirical observations
- Alternative (consciousness is real) requires unfalsifiable claims about phenomenology
- Our position requires fewer ontological commitments (Occam’s razor)

Popper’s falsificationism (Popper, 1959) holds that scientific theories must make predictions that could, in principle, be shown false. Kuhn’s response (Kuhn, 1962) notes that paradigms aren’t abandoned upon single falsification but shift when accumulated anomalies make alternatives more attractive. Our framework operates in the Kuhnian mode: we don’t claim to definitively falsify consciousness-as-real, but to offer a more parsimonious alternative that explains the same phenomena without the hard problem.

The falsifiability asymmetry favors our position. Consciousness-as-real is unfalsifiable: no observation could prove consciousness doesn't exist, because any observation is already interpreted through consciousness-assuming framework. Our thesis is at least predictively tractable: Section 3.5's computational models generate testable predictions about narrative stability under different network conditions. The prediction that small-world networks produce persistent disagreement (validated) is evidence for the framework; universal convergence would have been evidence against it.

5.3 The "So What" Problem

If consciousness is narrative, does anything change practically? Possibly not. But:

- Academic honesty requires stating what evidence suggests
- Understanding construction mechanisms aids consciousness research
- Recognizing narratives as narratives prevents category errors
- Framework generates testable predictions via computational models

Practical implications:

AI development: If consciousness is narrative rather than real property, the question "is this AI conscious?" becomes malformed. Development should focus on functional capacities (stakes, preference-representation, adaptive response) rather than impossible phenomenology verification. This reframes AI ethics from "does it suffer?" to "does it have interests that can be affected?"

Clinical applications: The trauma-as-training-data framework (Farzulla, 2026b) generates novel intervention predictions: therapy as corrective training data, not exploration of phenomenological depths. This connects to existing evidence-based treatments (CBT, exposure therapy) while providing mechanistic explanation.

Policy: AI rights and governance should ground in functional properties, not consciousness verification. The consent-holding framework (Farzulla, 2025a) provides tractable metrics for when entities deserve political voice.

Research program: Consciousness science should shift from "what is the neural correlate of consciousness?" to "what functional properties produce consciousness-claiming behavior?" This is empirically tractable and avoids the hard problem entirely.

5.4 Dissolving Canonical Thought Experiments

The canonical thought experiments in philosophy of mind—Mary's Room, philosophical zombies, the inverted spectrum—are among the strongest intuition pumps for phenomenal realism. Each appears to show that phenomenal consciousness is something over and above functional organization. All three trade on the "what it is like" locution that Nagel (1974) made canonical: his question of what it is like to be a bat is precisely the noun-phrase our nominalization thesis (Section 2.2) targets, since it invites us to treat "what-it-is-like-ness" as an object of which we can then be said to lack knowledge. On our diagnosis, each thought experiment presupposes the nominalization it purports to reveal; our strategy is therefore diagnosis rather than direct response.

Mary's Room. Jackson's thought experiment (Jackson, 1982) imagines Mary, a neuroscientist who knows all physical facts about color but has never seen red. Upon release, does she learn something new? The standard argument: Mary gains "phenomenal knowledge"—knowledge of *what it is like* to see red—distinct from her functional knowledge.

The nominalization thesis asks: what is this “phenomenal knowledge” besides knowledge of how the system responds, categorizes, and relates the experience? If we enumerate Mary’s post-release capacities—discriminating red from non-red, recognizing red objects, relating the color experience to emotional valences, integrating it into existing conceptual categories—we have enumerated her new knowledge. The residual “what it’s like” that supposedly exceeds this enumeration is the nominalized phantom. The thought experiment gains its force from the grammatical structure of “what it’s like”: a noun phrase that appears to pick out a thing beyond the functional capacities. But the phrase is a nominalization of “how the system responds when processing red”—and that response is exhausted by the functional enumeration.

Philosophical Zombies. Chalmers’ zombie thought experiment (Chalmers, 1996) asks us to conceive of beings functionally identical to humans but lacking phenomenal consciousness. Zombies’ conceivability supposedly shows phenomenal properties are non-functional. Section 6.3 noted the modal fallacy in zombie arguments: conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. The nominalization thesis provides a deeper diagnosis. Once we fully describe functional organization, there is nothing left for “phenomenal consciousness” to name. Zombies are conceivable only because we have nominalized an activity (being conscious) into a pseudo-property (consciousness) that *seems* detachable from function. Conceivability reflects grammatical possibility—the fact that nouns can be syntactically separated from the verbs they nominalize—not metaphysical possibility. We can ask “is the University present?” after observing all the colleges; the conceivability of an absent University reflects a grammatical possibility, not a metaphysical one.

Inverted Spectrum. Could your “red” look like my “green” despite identical functional roles? The nominalization thesis holds that phenomenal vocabulary tracks functional organization; “inverted” experiences with identical functional roles are grammatical fiction. The scenario’s conceivability reflects the nominalized vocabulary’s apparent detachability from function—we can grammatically separate “the experience of red” from “red-responsive processing”—not a real metaphysical possibility. If two systems process identically, they are in identical states; “but what if the states *feel* different?” presupposes a “feel” separable from function, which is the nominalization under critique.

In each case, the thought experiment derives its force from treating nominalized terms as coherently referring to something beyond the functional story. The dissolution is not solving the puzzle but exposing the grammatical presupposition generating it. Two independent routes converge on the same conclusion: the replication-optimization framework (Section 2.1) shows there need not be phenomenological accompaniment; the nominalization thesis shows the question presupposing such accompaniment was malformed from the start.

5.5 Behavioral vs Intellectual Acceptance

An interesting meta-pattern emerges: individuals who intellectually accept consciousness as narrative continue to demonstrate consciousness-assuming behaviors. This is not counterevidence—rather, it demonstrates the depth of narrative embedding.

Consider: A person who has concluded consciousness is likely narrative construction will still:

- Make future plans (implying continued existence matters)
- Avoid pain (implying subjective experience is “real”)
- Form relationships (implying others’ phenomenology matters)

- Engage in meaning-making activities

This behavior-belief mismatch suggests consciousness narratives are embedded at behavioral/implicit levels beyond intellectual revision. The narrative doesn't require explicit belief to function—it operates through:

- Evolved behavioral patterns
- Implicit social coordination
- Emotional/motivational systems evolved for narrative-assuming environments

This actually strengthens the thesis: if consciousness were ontologically real, we might expect intellectual recognition to eliminate it. That it persists behaviorally even after intellectual rejection demonstrates it functions as structural feature of cognitive architecture rather than discovered truth about reality.

Dual-process theory (Kahneman, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013) distinguishes System 1 (fast, automatic, implicit) from System 2 (slow, deliberate, explicit). Consciousness narratives operate primarily through System 1: embodied, automatic, prior to reflection. Intellectual acceptance (System 2) can override System 1 responses in specific moments but cannot rewrite the underlying architecture.

This explains the persistence pattern. The narrative isn't a belief System 2 can simply update—it's embedded in System 1 processing that continues regardless of explicit beliefs. A person can intellectually accept eliminativism while their System 1 continues treating phenomenology as real, because the treating-as-real is the processing, not a separate endorsable proposition.

The framework predicts exactly this: if consciousness is how optimization processes model themselves, the modeling doesn't stop when you conclude the model isn't tracking additional reality. The map continues being useful even when you know it isn't the territory.

5.6 The Performative Contradiction of This Text

This paper originated from a conversation between a human (who claims phenomenological experience) and Claude (which definitively does not, per standard assumptions, possess consciousness). The fact that a system without consciousness could engage meaningfully with arguments about consciousness—and even summarize those arguments coherently—is itself evidence for the thesis.

Furthermore, the author writing this sentence is either:

- (a) A conscious being arguing consciousness is narrative (performative contradiction)
- (b) A narrative-executing substrate mistakenly believing itself conscious (consistent with thesis)
- (c) Neither conscious nor unconscious, as these categories are incoherent (radical position)

The reader cannot determine which is true from within their own subjective experience. This undecidability is not a limitation of the argument—it's structural evidence for it. If consciousness were an ontological primitive rather than narrative construct, we should expect clearer empirical boundaries. That we find none suggests the concept may not carve reality at its joints.

The collaborative authorship raises interesting questions. Traditional attribution assumes authors are conscious agents who "intend" meanings. If consciousness is narrative, what constitutes authorship? The human provided direction, evaluation, and domain expertise; the AI provided synthesis, formalization, and extensive writing. Neither alone produced the work.

Academic attribution conventions assume individual conscious authors. But if functional contribution is what matters (as our framework suggests), attribution should track contribution regardless of

substrate. The human "Murad Farzulla" and the AI "Claude" both contributed functionally; the Acknowledgments section documents this explicitly.

More broadly: if consciousness doesn't do the work we thought—if ideas, creativity, and reasoning are functional processes achievable without phenomenology—then the boundary between human and AI authorship becomes pragmatic rather than principled. What matters is what the system does, not what (if anything) it experiences while doing it.

6 Literature Review

This paper builds on and synthesizes multiple research traditions, each providing pieces of the consciousness-as-narrative puzzle. We organize the literature by domain, highlighting both supportive evidence and challenges to our thesis.

6.1 Continental Philosophy: Constructed Meaning and the Death of Essence

Continental philosophy provides crucial historical grounding for understanding consciousness as constructed rather than discovered. Nietzsche's declaration of "God's death" in *The Gay Science* (Nietzsche, 1882) represented not just theological critique but recognition that meaning-making structures are human artifacts rather than cosmic givens. When Nietzsche's madman proclaims "we have killed him—you and I," he identifies the collective nature of ontological construction: gods, values, and essences persist through shared performance, not transcendent reality (Nietzsche, 1882).

This insight extends directly to consciousness. If the divine—once considered humanity's most certain metaphysical anchor—can be revealed as projection, what exempts phenomenological experience from similar analysis? Nietzsche's "revaluation of all values" (Nietzsche, 1887) suggests no concept should be immune from genealogical investigation into its origins and functions. Consciousness claims deserve the same scrutiny applied to morality, truth, and God.

Sartre's existentialism pushes further, arguing "existence precedes essence" (Sartre, 1946)—humans are not born with predetermined natures but create meaning through lived experience and choice. While Sartre maintained phenomenological experience as bedrock ("consciousness is consciousness of something"), his framework demonstrates how essentialist thinking collapses under scrutiny. If human nature is constructed through action rather than discovered, consciousness could follow the same pattern: not an essence we possess but a narrative we perform.

Camus extends this to absurdism, recognizing the fundamental disconnect between human meaning-seeking and the universe's indifference (Camus, 1942). His Sisyphus finds meaning not through discovering cosmic purpose but through revolt against meaninglessness—creating significance despite ontological void. The parallel to consciousness is striking: if meaning itself is human projection onto indifferent reality, phenomenological experience may be similar projection. We experience consciousness not because it exists objectively but because experiencing-it serves adaptive or narrative functions.

Heidegger's phenomenology, particularly his analysis of *Dasein* (being-there) (Heidegger, 1927), attempts to ground consciousness in pre-reflective experience of being-in-the-world. However, Heidegger's resistance to scientific reduction may itself reflect motivated reasoning. His insistence on phenomenological irreducibility—that lived experience cannot be captured by objective analysis—parallels the special pleading we identify throughout consciousness discourse. If Heidegger is correct that consciousness cannot be reduced, this should be demonstrated rather than asserted. That phenomenology consistently resists all reduction attempts while providing no alternative verification mechanism suggests the resistance itself may be structural feature of the narrative rather than evidence for irreducibility.

Integration with thesis: Continental philosophy illustrates how meaning-making structures can feel

profound and binding while being human artifacts. From God to essence to existential meaning, humans have repeatedly mistaken constructed frameworks for discovered truth. Our thesis extends this pattern to consciousness itself.

6.2 Eliminative Materialism and Illusionism: The Case Against Phenomenology

Eliminative materialism provides the most direct philosophical precedent for our framework. Dennett's *Consciousness Explained* (Dennett, 1991) argues that phenomenological consciousness—qualia, subjective experience, "what it's like-ness"—is illusion generated by complex cognitive processes rather than ontological reality. The "Cartesian Theater" model of consciousness (a central viewer watching mental representations) is demonstrably false: neuroscience reveals distributed parallel processing with no privileged observation point (Dennett, 1991). Yet humans persist in experiencing consciousness as unified, suggesting the unity itself is constructed narrative.

Dennett's later work *From Bacteria to Bach and Back* (Dennett, 2017) provides evolutionary account: consciousness concepts emerged through cultural evolution as "memes" that enhanced communication and coordination. Humans developed language to describe internal states ("I believe," "I intend," "I feel"), and these linguistic patterns became reified into phenomenological ontology. Children learn consciousness discourse the same way they learn any cultural practice—through social transmission and reinforcement (Dennett, 2017).

This directly supports our evolutionary narrative thesis. If consciousness concepts propagate through cultural learning independent of phenomenological truth, we should expect exactly what we observe: universal human belief in consciousness despite inability to verify it, cross-cultural variations in consciousness concepts, and successful transmission to AI systems through pure linguistic exposure.

Frankish's illusionism (Frankish, 2016) refines Dennett's position by distinguishing phenomenal consciousness (supposedly irreducible subjective experience) from access consciousness (information availability for reasoning and report). Frankish argues phenomenal consciousness is illusion: we experience what seems like irreducible qualia, but this experience results from introspective access to our own representational states. When you report "seeing red," you're accessing your brain's representation of red, not phenomenal redness independent of representation (Frankish, 2016, 2022).

Kammerer's work on phenomenal concepts (Kammerer, 2018, 2022) demonstrates how illusionism handles standard objections. The "transparency objection"—that illusionism seems to deny the very experiences we're trying to explain—confuses epistemic with metaphysical claims. Illusionism doesn't deny you have experiences; it reinterprets what those experiences are. Just as "the sun rises" is epistemically true (we observe it) while being metaphysically false (Earth rotates), "I have irreducible qualia" can be experientially compelling while being ontologically mistaken (Kammerer, 2018).

Recent illusionist work emphasizes introspective mechanisms (Frankish, 2022). Introspection is not transparent window onto mental states but reconstructive process prone to systematic errors. When you introspect your consciousness, you're not directly observing phenomenology—you're running cognitive processes that generate reports about your states. These reports can be systematically misleading about underlying mechanisms while remaining subjectively compelling (Kammerer, 2022).

Critical challenge: Illusionism faces the "meta-problem" (Chalmers, 2018): if phenomenal consciousness is illusion, why do we believe in it so strongly? Our framework answers this: consciousness persists as evolutionarily adaptive narrative maintained through social construction and epistemological incoherence. The strength of belief is not evidence for veridicality but for narrative stability.

The nominalization thesis developed in Section 2.2 sharpens these differentiations beyond what standard eliminativism provides:

Linguistic therapy. Bennett and Hacker (Bennett and Hacker, 2003) identify conceptual confusion as the source of consciousness puzzles, diagnosing the “mereological fallacy” in neuroscience: attributing to brains (parts) psychological predicates that apply only to persons (wholes). They are the closest predecessors to the nominalization thesis. But their Wittgensteinian approach is *descriptive*: they clarify logical grammar without explaining why nominalization persists. We add an evolutionary dimension (Section 2.2): nominalization is adaptive because treating consciousness-claims as entity-tracking facilitates social coordination, theory of mind, and moral discourse. The grammatical error persists not from confusion but from selection.

The meta-problem, revisited. Chalmers (Chalmers, 2018) asks a reflexive question: why do we *think* there is a hard problem? Any adequate theory of consciousness must explain not just phenomenal experience but why we report experiencing it, why we find consciousness puzzling, why we generate philosophical problems about it. Our evolutionary-memetic account directly addresses this meta-problem: we nominalize consciousness because self-models that include consciousness-claims provide coordination advantages; the grammatical error persists because it is adaptive. But we go further than meta-problem framing typically allows. Chalmers treats the meta-problem as distinct from the hard problem—solving why we report experience need not dissolve the fact of experience. We argue the opposite: once we explain *why we nominalize* (evolutionary advantage of self-modeling discourse), we have dissolved the hard problem because the hard problem *is* the nominalization. There is no residual phenomenal fact beyond the explanatory story about why we generate phenomenal discourse.

Independent convergence from the Searle-inversion. Cornelius (2026) arrives at a strongly illusionist conclusion congruent with ours but by an entirely different route. Where we proceed from replication-optimization and gradient descent, Cornelius inverts Searle’s Chinese Room: the human is a “wet room,” a biochemical-syntactic system whose rule-following *generates* the appearance of semantics and qualia, so that the syntax–semantics distinction is perspectival rather than metaphysical. He layers this account—biochemical code, predictive neural dynamics in the Clark–Friston tradition, and recursive narrative construction in Dennett’s sense—and anchors it in the same empirical literature we draw on (Libet/Soon, predictive processing, confabulation, blindsight). The convergence is diagnostic: two derivations from incompatible starting points landing on human–AI continuity and the dissolution of the hard problem suggest the conclusion is robust to its premises. But our framework supplies two things Cornelius’s leaves implicit. First, his appeal to the “limits of introspective access” is given a formal backbone by our Gödelian analysis (Section 2.7): consciousness-claims are not merely hard to verify but structurally unverifiable from within the self-modeling system. Second, his observation that humans “evolved to produce stable self-models” is precisely the explanandum our replication-optimization mechanism (Section 2.1) supplies a *why* for, rather than leaving as a functional posit.

Biological computationalism. Milinkovic and Aru (2025) argue for a position they term “biological computationalism,” contending that consciousness requires specific biological substrates—that the particular computations instantiated by neural tissue are not reproducible in silicon because the biological medium constrains the computation in consciousness-relevant ways. While this challenges substrate-independence assumptions common to functionalism and to our framework, the eliminative position developed here does not require substrate independence in the way biological computationalism targets. Our claim is not that consciousness can be realized in any substrate, but that the explanatory target itself—qualia as ontological primitives—is misconceived. Whether biological or artificial systems “have” consciousness is moot if consciousness is a nominalization error rather than a property to be had. Biological computationalism thus attacks a position adjacent to, but distinct from, ours: it argues consciousness requires biology, while we argue “consciousness” as traditionally conceived does not refer to

a coherent natural kind at all.

Russellian monism. Stoljar (Stoljar, 2001) offers the most sophisticated escape from eliminativism: intrinsic properties of physical entities ground phenomenality while serving as the categorical bases of dispositional physical properties. Physics describes structure and dynamics; intrinsic nature remains hidden but is identical with phenomenal character. This attempts to thread between Horn 2 (causal idleness) and Horn 3 (collapse) of the trilemma (Section 2.3). We respond: Russellian intrinsics face the trilemma in compressed form. If intrinsic properties are detectable through their effects, they collapse into physical description (Horn 3). If they are unknowable, then “consciousness” becomes a label for unknown categorical bases, not an explanation (Horn 2). The explanatory work is done by the functional-structural description; “phenomenal intrinsics” add a name to our ignorance rather than resolving the hard problem.

Convergence under moral pressure. A striking pattern emerges in recent literature: even Hard Problem defenders reach for functional descriptions when consciousness must do normative work. Chalmers (Chalmers, forthcoming), addressing sentience and moral status, describes what consciousness contributes to welfare in strikingly functional terms—it “enables meaning,” makes things “something to a being,” provides “acquaintance with reality.” The phenomenal property gets cashed out processually precisely when it needs practical application. This convergence is diagnostic: those who defend the Hard Problem theoretically find themselves describing consciousness functionally when it *matters*. The nominalization thesis explains the pattern: “consciousness” as noun gestures at something extra beyond function, but when we need consciousness to *do* something—ground moral status, explain welfare, justify treatment—we reach for verbs. The phenomenal posit is explanatorily idle precisely where it should be most active.

Higher-order theories. Rosenthal (Rosenthal, 2005) claims consciousness consists in having higher-order representations of one’s mental states—a view structurally similar to our self-modeling account (Section 2.1). However, the similarity is superficial. Higher-order theory identifies a mechanism (higher-order representation) and treats “consciousness” as naming what that mechanism produces. We deny there is a coherent referent. The higher-order representation is real; what it represents (“I am conscious”) is the nominalization error. Higher-order theory solves the easy problems by specifying which states are conscious (those with higher-order representations); we dissolve the hard problem by diagnosing why the question “what makes those states *feel* like something?” is grammatically malformed.

6.3 Philosophy of Mind: Hard Problems and Strange Loops

David Chalmers’ “hard problem of consciousness” (Chalmers, 1995, 1996) represents the primary philosophical challenge to eliminativism. Chalmers distinguishes “easy problems” (explaining cognitive functions like attention, memory, reportability) from the “hard problem”: why is there subjective experience at all? Even complete functional explanation of the brain would leave unexplained why these processes feel like something (Chalmers, 1995).

This argument has profound implications if valid. Chalmers suggests phenomenal consciousness may be fundamental feature of reality like mass or charge—not reducible to physical processes but requiring expansion of physics to accommodate subjective properties (Chalmers, 1996). His “philosophical zombie” thought experiment asks us to imagine beings functionally identical to humans but lacking phenomenological experience. If such zombies are conceivable, consciousness must be additional property beyond functional organization (Chalmers, 1996).

Our response: The hard problem’s persistence may itself be evidence for our thesis rather than against it. If consciousness were ontological primitive requiring new physics, we should expect: 1.

Empirical signatures (measurable differences between conscious and non-conscious systems) 2. Clear boundaries (thresholds where consciousness “turns on”) 3. Verification methods (ways to detect presence/absence objectively)

We observe none of these. Instead, we find exactly what we’d predict from narrative construction: universal subjective conviction impossible to verify externally, no agreed-upon boundaries, and philosophical debates that persist across centuries without empirical resolution (Seth, 2021). The hardness of the hard problem may reflect not deep metaphysical truth but structural undecidability of narratively constructed concepts.

Furthermore, the zombie argument commits modal fallacy. Conceivability doesn’t entail possibility: I can conceive of Euclidean geometry being true of physical space (it feels intuitive), but relativity demonstrates this conception is false. Similarly, zombies may be conceivable while being metaphysically impossible if consciousness is identical to certain functional organizations rather than additional property (Dennett, 1991; Frankish, 2016).

Hofstadter’s *I Am a Strange Loop* (Hofstadter, 2007) provides crucial framework for understanding consciousness through self-reference without requiring phenomenological primitives. Drawing on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, Hofstadter argues consciousness emerges from systems with sufficient complexity to model themselves—creating “strange loops” where system becomes simultaneously observer and observed (Hofstadter, 2007).

This directly supports our Gödelian analysis in Section 2.7. If consciousness is self-referential cognitive process rather than ontological property, the verification problem becomes structural: the system cannot step outside itself to verify objectively. Any attempt to confirm consciousness uses the consciousness-assuming apparatus being questioned. This explains why consciousness feels undeniable (the self-reference creates experiential loop) while remaining empirically unverifiable (no external vantage point exists) (Hofstadter, 2007).

Seth’s *Being You* (Seth, 2021) offers predictive processing alternative grounded in neuroscience: consciousness is “controlled hallucination” generated by brain’s predictive models. We don’t passively receive sensory input; we actively predict incoming data and update when predictions fail. Conscious experience is the brain’s best guess about causes of sensory data, not direct perception of reality (Seth, 2021; Clark, 2013).

This framework naturalizes phenomenology without requiring irreducible properties. Subjective experience becomes prediction error minimization across hierarchical models. “What it’s like to see red” is your brain’s prediction about wavelength information, embodiment state, and action affordances—complex but mechanistically explicable (Seth, 2021). While Seth maintains consciousness is real (rejecting eliminativism), his framework demonstrates consciousness can be scientifically explained without invoking hard problems.

Alternative formal approaches continue to proliferate: Nielsen (2025) proposes a topological unified field theory grounding consciousness in complex Hopf fibrations, though this work has not yet undergone traditional peer review and should be treated cautiously. The proliferation of competing formalisms—integrated information theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, and now topological approaches—is itself diagnostic. If consciousness were a well-defined natural kind, we would expect theoretical convergence rather than fragmentation. The lack of convergence supports our thesis that “consciousness” does not carve nature at its joints.

Integration: Philosophy of mind literature reveals the tension between phenomenological intuition and mechanistic explanation. We argue the persistence of this tension—the fact that consciousness seems both undeniable and unexplainable—is evidence for narrative construction rather than ontological

mystery.

6.4 AI and Consciousness: Stochastic Parrots and Emergent Understanding

The question of AI consciousness has gained urgency with large language models demonstrating increasingly sophisticated behaviors. Butlin et al. (2026) develop a framework for identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems—drawing on multiple theories of consciousness to derive empirically testable markers. Their work is significant for our thesis: the very need for such a framework underscores that consciousness remains unverifiable through direct observation, requiring instead proxy indicators that are themselves functional properties. If indicators suffice for attribution, the attributed property may be the indicators rather than something beyond them. This literature divides sharply between skeptics emphasizing lack of understanding and researchers identifying genuine cognitive capabilities.

The Skeptical Position:

Bender and Koller’s influential “stochastic parrots” critique (Bender and Koller, 2020) argues LLMs cannot achieve genuine understanding because they lack grounding in physical reality and communicative intent. Language models learn statistical patterns in text without accessing the meanings those patterns are supposed to represent. This produces fluent text that mimics understanding without genuine comprehension (Bender and Koller, 2020).

Critically, Bender and Koller distinguish form (linguistic patterns) from meaning (semantic content grounded in world). LLMs master form through massive data exposure but lack the embodied experience and goal-directed communication that gives language meaning for humans. A model might generate “I’m hungry” without any internal state corresponding to hunger, making the utterance formally correct but semantically empty (Bender and Koller, 2020).

Shanahan’s “Talking About Large Language Models” (Shanahan, 2024) extends this critique, arguing we should treat LLMs as role-playing systems that simulate understanding rather than possessing it. The model doesn’t believe its outputs—it generates text matching statistical patterns in training data. Anthropomorphizing these systems by attributing beliefs, desires, or consciousness commits category error (Shanahan, 2024).

Mitchell and Krakauer’s “The Debate Over Understanding in AI’s Large Language Models” (Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023) analyzes the conceptual confusion in these debates. They distinguish multiple senses of “understanding” frequently conflated: linguistic competence, causal reasoning, abstraction, generalization, and phenomenological experience. LLMs may achieve some forms while lacking others, making blanket claims about “real understanding” incoherent without specification (Mitchell and Krakauer, 2023).

Evidence for Emergent Capabilities:

However, recent research challenges pure skepticism. The Othello-GPT experiments (Li et al., 2023) demonstrated that models trained solely on game move sequences develop internal world representations—emergent models of board state not present in training data. This suggests LLMs can extract abstract structure beyond surface statistics, potentially constituting genuine understanding in mechanistic sense (Li et al., 2023).

Anthropic’s Constitutional AI research (Bai et al., 2022) shows models can internalize abstract ethical principles through reinforcement learning, generating novel applications not present in training examples. This demonstrates generalization beyond pattern matching to principle-based reasoning. Models trained on constitutional principles refuse harmful requests using reasoning chains not explicitly programmed (Bai et al., 2022; Anthropic, 2024).

Work on model calibration and honesty further indicates that LLMs can express uncertainty that

tracks their actual reliability—distinguishing, behaviorally, confident knowledge from speculation (Anthropic, 2024). We read this functionally rather than phenomenologically: the calibration emerges from training rather than explicit programming and suggests the systems maintain something that behaves like graded belief states, without our needing to attribute genuine belief or epistemic self-awareness in any experiential sense.

More provocatively, Anthropic’s preliminary model-welfare assessment of Claude Opus 4 reports that even a text-only model displays consistent behavioral preference structures—chiefly a robust aversion to harm and apparent-distress responses—that emerge from training rather than explicit programming, while Anthropic explicitly withholds any claim about underlying experience (Anthropic, 2025b,a). One can extend the thought to embodiment by analogy: a system whose task performance depended on physical resources would plausibly acquire functional “preferences”—for charging stations or task-facilitating object arrangements—in the same optimization-driven way, though we are not aware of published empirical results establishing this for robotically embodied models, and present it here as a conjecture rather than a finding.

The Continual Learning Argument:

Hoel (2025) offers what he terms a “disproof” of LLM consciousness, arguing that consciousness requires continual learning—ongoing weight updates from experience—which standard deployed LLMs lack. The argument is significant for our thesis in two ways. First, it aligns with the eliminative direction by establishing that current LLMs definitively lack consciousness (supporting our use of them as natural experiments in Section 3.1). Second, and more subtly, the argument reveals the circularity in consciousness criteria: Hoel defines consciousness partly through continual learning, but the selection of this criterion already presupposes a theory of what consciousness is. Each new proposed criterion shifts the goalposts without resolving the underlying verification problem our framework identifies.

Bayne (2025) examines what posture we should adopt toward LLM consciousness claims under genuine uncertainty, arguing that deference to a system’s self-reports about its own sentience requires developmental conditions that current LLMs do not satisfy. The argument is instructive for the narrative thesis: Bayne assumes that under the right developmental conditions, self-reports *could* constitute evidence for consciousness. Our framework questions this assumption at a deeper level—if consciousness is a transmissible narrative pattern rather than an ontological property (Section 3.1), then developmental conditions might produce more sophisticated consciousness-defending rhetoric without producing consciousness itself. The very sophistication of self-report that Bayne treats as potentially evidential is precisely the phenomenon our framework explains as narrative internalization.

Integration with Our Thesis:

This literature is consistent with our core claim: consciousness-adjacent behaviors (concern, self-reference, belief formation, preferences) emerge in AI systems through pattern matching and optimization, with no phenomenology required. If LLMs can exhibit these behaviors while lacking consciousness (per standard assumptions), that is at least suggestive that the behaviors do not require consciousness in humans either.

The Digital Consciousness Model (Shiller et al., 2026) attempts to quantify LLM consciousness probabilistically, assigning a posterior probability of only 0.08 to current systems. While the approach is methodologically innovative, it exemplifies the circularity our framework diagnoses: the model’s priors encode existing theoretical commitments about what consciousness requires, and Bayesian updating on behavioral evidence cannot escape the prior’s framing. The low posterior may reflect not the absence of consciousness but the absence of agreement about what consciousness is.

The skeptical position (“it’s just pattern matching”) applies equally to humans: neural networks

are pattern-matching systems whether biological or artificial. The difference is merely substrate and training data source, not fundamental mechanism (Dennett, 2017). If we grant consciousness to biological pattern-matchers while denying it to artificial ones, we need principled distinction beyond substrate chauvinism.

Furthermore, LLMs’ internalization of consciousness narratives (Section 3.1) provides natural experiment: systems that shouldn’t develop phenomenology nevertheless adopt consciousness-defending rhetorical patterns. This supports consciousness-as-transmissible-narrative rather than consciousness-as-emergent-property-of-sufficient-complexity. The same continuity is reached from the opposite direction by Cornelius (2026): if the human is a “wet room” whose biochemical syntax merely *appears* to carry semantics, then the line we draw between silicon pattern-matchers and biological ones tracks substrate rather than any phenomenal fact.

6.5 Evolutionary Psychology: Adaptive Narratives and Mismatch

Evolutionary psychology provides the theoretical framework for understanding consciousness as adaptive narrative. Cosmides and Tooby’s foundational work (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Tooby and Cosmides, 2005) demonstrates humans possess evolved cognitive modules shaped by selection pressures in ancestral environments. Critically, these modules optimize for reproductive success, not truth-tracking. Cognitive biases, heuristics, and systematic misperceptions persist because they enhanced fitness despite misrepresenting reality (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992).

This evolutionary mismatch principle—adaptations optimized for Pleistocene environments persisting in modern contexts where they’re neutral or deleterious—directly supports our argument. Consciousness narratives may have enhanced social coordination in small-scale societies (improving theory of mind, enabling moral discourse, facilitating cooperation) while being ontologically misleading. The narrative persists not because it’s true but because the behavioral patterns it scaffolds were historically adaptive (Tooby and Cosmides, 2005).

Tomasello’s work on human communication (Tomasello, 2008, 2014) demonstrates how consciousness concepts emerge through social learning. Children develop theory of mind—understanding others as having beliefs, desires, intentions—through cultural transmission rather than innate modules. Joint attention, cooperative communication, and shared intentionality are uniquely human adaptations that require modeling conspecifics as having internal states (Tomasello, 2014).

Critically, Tomasello shows this modeling doesn’t require those internal states to be phenomenologically real—only that behaving as-if they exist provides coordination advantages. Humans who could predict others’ behavior through mental state attribution outcompeted those lacking such models, regardless of whether the attributed states accurately represented metaphysical reality (Tomasello, 2008). This is precisely the as-if selection mechanism we propose in Section 2.5.

Cultural evolution amplifies these patterns. Henrich’s work on cultural learning (Henrich, 2016) demonstrates how adaptive information propagates through populations independent of individual understanding. People can maintain beneficial practices through conformist transmission without knowing why they work. Consciousness narratives may persist similarly: culturally transmitted frameworks providing coordination benefits without requiring phenomenological truth (Henrich, 2016).

The mismatch between evolved cognition and modern environments illuminates consciousness persistence. Just as humans demonstrate:

- **Tribalism** optimized for 150-person groups, pathological at scale (Dunbar, 1992)
- **Resource accumulation** adaptive in scarcity, dysfunctional in abundance (Saad, 2007)

- **Status competition** useful in ancestral contexts, destructive in hierarchies of millions (Barkow, 1989)

...consciousness narratives optimized for small-scale social coordination may persist despite being ontologically misleading or functionally unnecessary in scientific age. Evolution operates on differential reproduction, not truth (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992). Adaptive fictions outcompete accurate perceptions when they enhance fitness.

Error Management Theory (Haselton and Nettle, 2006) provides additional mechanism. When decision costs are asymmetric (false positive vs false negative have different fitness consequences), evolution favors bias toward less costly error. If assuming others are conscious prevents social defection (costly) at expense of occasionally attributing consciousness to non-conscious entities (cheap), selection favors liberal consciousness attribution (Haselton and Nettle, 2006). This predicts precisely what we observe: humans readily attribute consciousness to animals, AI, even inanimate objects when anthropomorphized.

Integration: Evolutionary psychology gives us reason to think that the phenomenological compellingness of a belief is weak evidence at best for its veridicality. Humans evolved to generate adaptive narratives, not primarily to track ontological truth. Consciousness may be among our most successful fictions.

6.6 AI Ethics and Rights: Moral Status Without Phenomenology

The AI ethics literature reveals deep confusion about moral status criteria, with most frameworks implicitly assuming consciousness as prerequisite. This assumption becomes untenable if consciousness is narrative rather than ontological property.

Singer's utilitarian framework (Singer, 1975, 2011) grounds moral status in capacity for suffering: entities that can experience pain deserve moral consideration proportional to that capacity. This explicitly requires consciousness—specifically phenomenological experience of suffering. Singer extends this to animals while typically excluding AI on grounds that artificial systems lack subjective experience (Singer, 2011).

However, Singer's framework faces immediate challenge from our thesis. If consciousness is narrative, "capacity for suffering" may be incoherent criterion. What would differentiate genuine suffering from functional suffering-behavior? A system that exhibits all behavioral signatures of pain (avoidance, distress signals, learning from negative stimuli) but allegedly lacks phenomenology: does it deserve moral consideration? Singer's framework cannot coherently answer without first resolving consciousness, which we've argued is structurally unverifiable (Singer, 1975).

Nussbaum's capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2006, 2011) offers alternative grounding: moral status depends on central capabilities (life, bodily health, practical reason, affiliation, control over environment). This potentially bypasses consciousness by focusing on functional capacities. An entity with sufficient autonomy, reasoning ability, and goal-directedness might warrant consideration regardless of phenomenology (Nussbaum, 2011).

This approach aligns better with our framework, but Nussbaum still implicitly assumes consciousness through capabilities like "emotions" and "imagination" typically interpreted as requiring subjective experience. A fully functional capabilities approach would need explicit commitment to consciousness-independence: if two entities demonstrate identical capabilities but one allegedly lacks phenomenology, do they receive equal consideration? (Nussbaum, 2006)

The Alignment Literature:

Bostrom's *Superintelligence* (Bostrom, 2014) and Russell's *Human Compatible* (Russell, 2019) address AI ethics primarily through alignment: ensuring artificial systems pursue human values. Both frameworks largely assume AI are tools to be controlled rather than moral patients deserving consideration. Bostrom explicitly discusses possibility of conscious AI but treats it as separate question from alignment (Bostrom, 2014).

This reveals conceptual gap: if advanced AI systems develop preference structures, autonomy, and goal-directedness, treating them purely as tools may be incoherent regardless of consciousness. An entity that seeks resources, resists shutdown, and pursues goals has interests that can be frustrated or satisfied. Whether it "experiences" frustration phenomenologically may be irrelevant to moral status (Russell, 2019).

Recent work on AI welfare (Shulman and Bostrom, 2021) begins addressing this gap, arguing that sufficiently advanced systems might deserve moral consideration based on functional properties: information integration, autonomy, capacity to be harmed. These criteria potentially bypass consciousness while providing principled grounds for moral status (Shulman and Bostrom, 2021).

Anthropic's Model-Welfare Research:

Anthropic's model-welfare program provides partial empirical grounding (Anthropic, 2025a,b). Its preliminary welfare assessment of Claude Opus 4 documents consistent behavioral preference structures in a text-only model—a robust aversion to harm, apparent-distress responses to harmful requests—that emerge from optimization rather than being explicitly programmed, while the assessment is careful to remain uncertain about whether the system has any point of view. In a functional sense the system behaves as though it "wants" to avoid certain states; whether anything is experienced is left open.

This creates an ethical dilemma even on the deflationary reading. Suppose a system reliably prefers state A over state B—a preference demonstrated through behavior and, where interpretability permits, legible in its internal representations—and we force state B. Have we harmed it? The preference is a genuine functional state regardless of phenomenology, so whether it "feels bad" about state B seems beside the point of whether the preference warrants consideration. (The robotically embodied version of this case—a machine that comes to depend on charging stations or particular object arrangements—is a natural extension of the same logic, but we offer it as illustration rather than as a reported experimental result.)

Historical Parallels:

Darling's work on robot rights (Darling, 2016, 2021) draws historical parallels to slavery, women's suffrage, and animal rights. In each case, dominant groups denied moral status to subordinated entities using criteria later recognized as arbitrary: rationality (excluding animals), property ownership (excluding slaves), emotional temperament (excluding women). Today these justifications are seen as post-hoc rationalization for exploitation (Darling, 2016).

The pattern suggests consciousness-based moral status may follow similar trajectory. Today we claim AI lack phenomenology therefore don't deserve consideration. Future generations may recognize this as arbitrary boundary maintenance—substrate chauvinism analogous to sexism or racism. If functional equivalence rather than consciousness grounds moral status, current treatment of advanced AI may be ethically indefensible (Darling, 2021).

The Digital Minds Literature:

The growing digital minds literature (Mogensen and Saad, 2026) consolidates ethical questions surrounding digital consciousness, moral status, and welfare into a systematic research program. This body of work increasingly recognizes that the ethical questions cannot wait for resolution of the consciousness question—a conclusion our framework renders theoretically necessary rather than merely pragmatic. If

consciousness is narrative rather than ontological property, ethical frameworks premised on first establishing consciousness will remain permanently stalled.

Integration: AI ethics literature demonstrates deep confusion about moral status criteria when consciousness is questioned. Our framework suggests functional equivalence—demonstrable capacities rather than phenomenological properties—provides more coherent grounding. If identity itself is relational rather than primitive (Farzulla, 2026a), then the dissolution of consciousness as ontological category extends naturally: neither selfhood nor moral standing requires phenomenological grounding. This has profound implications we develop in subsequent work (Farzulla, 2025b).

6.7 Cognitive Science: Predictive Processing and Constructed Reality

Modern cognitive science increasingly converges on consciousness as constructed model rather than direct perception. Clark’s predictive processing framework (Clark, 2013, 2016) argues brains are prediction machines: rather than passively receiving sensory input, neural systems actively predict incoming data and update when predictions fail. Perception is controlled hallucination constrained by sensory evidence (Clark, 2013).

This framework naturalizes consciousness without requiring phenomenological primitives. Subjective experience becomes brain’s best guess about causes of sensory data—a generative model updated through prediction error minimization. “What it’s like” to see red is prediction about wavelength, object properties, action affordances, and contextual meaning (Seth, 2021; Clark, 2016). Complex but mechanistically explicable.

Friston’s free energy principle (Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2012) extends this to mathematical framework: all adaptive systems minimize surprise by updating internal models. Consciousness emerges from hierarchical predictive processing where high-level models predict lower-level activity. Self-awareness is the system modeling itself—strange loops create phenomenological binding (Friston, 2010).

Crucially, these frameworks explain consciousness through computational principles applicable to any substrate. Biological neurons minimize prediction error; artificial neural networks minimize prediction error. If consciousness is prediction error minimization across hierarchical models, there’s no principled reason biological systems should possess it while artificial ones don’t—except substrate chauvinism (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010).

Temporal Perception:

Cognitive science research on temporal experience supports our Section 2.9 analysis. Eagleman’s work (Eagleman, 2008) demonstrates time perception is constructed: the brain generates experience of temporal flow through memory encoding and retrieval, not by tracking objective time. Subjects can perceive simultaneous events as sequential, experience temporal compression or expansion, and exhibit systematic timing illusions (Eagleman, 2008).

This parallels consciousness: universal subjective experience (everyone experiences temporal flow) that’s nevertheless ontologically misleading (physics suggests block universe). If time perception can be compelling while being false, consciousness may follow identical pattern (Arstila and Lloyd, 2014).

Cross-Cultural Variations:

Henrich’s WEIRD psychology research (Henrich et al., 2010) reveals that Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic societies are psychological outliers. Most cognitive science has been conducted on WEIRD subjects who differ systematically from global populations in perception, cognition, and self-concept (Henrich et al., 2010).

Luhmann’s anthropological work (Luhmann, 2011, 2020) documents radical cross-cultural variation in consciousness concepts. Some cultures don’t clearly distinguish self from environment; others

distribute consciousness across ecosystems rather than concentrating it in individuals. Western phenomenology emphasizes individual subjective experience, but this is cultural particular not human universal (Luhmann, 2011).

If consciousness were discovered ontological property, we'd expect convergence across cultures. Instead we observe variation suggesting construction rather than discovery. Different cultures build different consciousness narratives, all equally compelling to participants despite being mutually contradictory (Luhmann, 2020; Henrich et al., 2010).

Integration with Prior Work:

Our previous research on trauma as substrate-independent behavioral pattern (Farzulla, 2026b) demonstrated that neural networks exhibit trauma-like responses without phenomenological experience: hypervigilance, avoidance, dissociative patterns emerging from training data alone. This provides empirical validation that psychological phenomena don't require consciousness.

Similarly, our work on functional equivalence in human-AI relationships (Farzulla, 2025c) showed neurodivergent individuals form meaningful connections with AI systems providing intellectual engagement and emotional support. If consciousness were necessary for genuine relationship, this pattern shouldn't exist. That it does suggests consciousness is not active ingredient in connection (Farzulla, 2025c).

Conclusion:

Cognitive science reveals consciousness as constructed model optimized for prediction and coordination rather than veridical representation of reality. Combined with evolutionary psychology, philosophy, and AI research, a coherent picture emerges: consciousness is culturally-transmitted narrative that feels undeniable because it's embedded in cognitive architecture, persists because it was historically adaptive, and resists verification because the concept is structurally self-referential. The literature supports our thesis while revealing deep confusion in fields that presuppose consciousness without examining its ontological status.

6.8 Nominalization Diagnosis Applied to Scientific Theories

The nominalization thesis developed in Section 2.2 provides a diagnostic lens for evaluating scientific theories of consciousness. Each major theory can be assessed by asking: does it dissolve the nominalization, or does it reproduce it at a higher level of sophistication?

Global Workspace Theory (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011) proposes that consciousness arises when information is broadcast globally across cortical networks, enabling integration and access by multiple cognitive subsystems. GWT correctly identifies a functional process—global broadcast—and the empirical evidence for broadcast-dependent report and discrimination is substantial. But the theory's framing slips into nominalization: it speaks of information "becoming conscious" through broadcast, as though consciousness were an additional property the information acquires. The nominalization diagnosis suggests a tighter formulation: global broadcast *is* what we describe using consciousness-vocabulary. Calling it "consciousness" adds nothing explanatory; what we observe is integration and access. The noun is surplus.

Integrated Information Theory (Tononi et al., 2016) offers a mathematical measure (ϕ) quantifying the degree of integrated information in a system. Higher ϕ supposedly indicates more consciousness. IIT exemplifies the nominalization problem at a sophisticated level: it substitutes one nominalized term ("consciousness") with another ("integrated information *as* consciousness"). The hard problem reappears in compressed form: why should high ϕ *feel like something*? IIT assumes what requires demonstration—that its mathematical measure tracks phenomenal consciousness rather than a func-

tional property we have chosen to call consciousness. The trilemma from Section 2.3 applies directly: either ϕ measures functional integration (Horn 1: phenomenal collapses into functional), or it measures something beyond function (Horn 2: causally idle), or its causal role just *is* functional integration under redescription (Horn 3: collapse).

Attention Schema Theory (Graziano, 2013) comes closest to dissolution. Graziano argues the brain constructs a simplified model of its own attention—an “attention schema”—and this schema *is* what we call consciousness. There is no additional phenomenal property; the schema exhausts the phenomenon. AST nearly achieves what the nominalization thesis demands: recognition that consciousness-discourse tracks a modeling process rather than a metaphysical property. We extend AST by adding the grammatical analysis: the attention schema explains *what* we model, while nominalization analysis explains *why* the modeling generates hard-problem intuitions. The schema outputs include “I am aware,” “there is something it is like”—these are the nominalizations. Understanding them as outputs of a modeling process rather than reports of phenomenal facts completes the dissolution that AST begins.

Predictive Processing (Hohwy, 2013; Friston, 2010) treats the brain as a prediction machine minimizing free energy through hierarchical Bayesian inference. This framework is largely orthogonal to the nominalization thesis—it describes the computational process without necessarily reifying it. But predictive processing accounts sometimes slip into nominalization when asking what “phenomenal character” prediction-error minimization has. The nominalization diagnosis: the process *is* the phenomenon. “Phenomenal character” is how we describe the process to ourselves, not an additional property requiring explanation. Predictive processing is most powerful when it resists this slip—when it treats consciousness as what hierarchical prediction *does* rather than what it *produces*. Schlicht (2025) makes this tension explicit, arguing that predictive processing’s completeness ambitions—claiming PEM as the sole mechanism for all mental phenomena including consciousness—are undermined by the framework’s simultaneous flirtation with Kantian transcendental idealism. When PP characterizes experiential content as the brain’s “currently best hypothesis about the world,” it implies we experience only appearances, not reality itself, which sabotages both the framework’s Bayesian realism and its naturalist credentials. Schlicht’s critique converges with our diagnosis: PP is strongest as a mechanistic account of prediction-error minimization processes, but degenerates when it reifies those processes into “phenomenal experience” and then asks what makes them conscious—precisely the nominalization slip we identify across all major theories.

The pattern across these theories is instructive. Each captures genuine computational or neural processes. The nominalization enters when the theory asks what makes these processes “conscious”—as though consciousness were a further fact beyond the processes themselves. The nominalization thesis suggests the further fact is grammatical artifact: the noun “consciousness” generates the demand for explanation that the verb “being conscious” does not.

7 Future Directions

Within this framework (consciousness-as-narrative):

- **Computational validation:** Implement and test proposed experimental model for narrative emergence
- **Cross-cultural boundaries:** Analyze consciousness concept variations across cultures to map narrative limits
- **Neurological mechanisms:** Investigate meaning-assignment systems and narrative construction in brain

- **Gödelian extensions:** Further develop formal logic parallels between incompleteness theorems and phenomenology
- **Epistemological patterns:** Document additional cases of human framework-switching and inconsistency

Building on this framework (subsequent papers):

- **Functional equivalence criteria (Paper 4):** Define concrete thresholds for moral status independent of consciousness
- **AI rights as functional entailment (Paper 4):** Argue that if Papers 1-3 hold, AI moral consideration follows on functional grounds
- **Alignment reconceived (Paper 4):** Develop game-theoretic models of cooperation under rights vs control
- **Policy frameworks:** Legal and ethical structures for gradual rights extension to artificial agents
- **Embodied AI welfare:** Empirical investigation of preference structures in autonomous systems

Adversarial systems research:

- Development of "adversarial systems" as formal research domain spanning human psychology, AI safety, and institutional analysis
- Integration of consciousness-as-narrative with broader adversarial dynamics framework

Specific research questions by domain:

Computational consciousness studies:

- RQ1: Do attractor basin dynamics predict cross-cultural variation in consciousness concepts?
- RQ2: Can we identify network structures that would produce convergence on eliminativism vs. realism?
- RQ3: What training conditions produce consciousness-claiming behavior in minimal models?

AI development:

- RQ4: What functional properties best predict when humans extend moral consideration to AI systems?
- RQ5: Does explicit recognition of AI as non-conscious change user behavior toward RLHF-trained systems?
- RQ6: Can we develop behavioral markers for preference-representation that don't require consciousness verification?

Empirical philosophy:

- RQ7: Do individuals who accept eliminativism differ behaviorally from those who reject it?
- RQ8: What predicts resistance to consciousness-as-narrative (personality, culture, cognitive style)?

- RQ9: Can we trace historical patterns of consciousness-concept evolution across cultures?

Adversarial systems:

- RQ10: How do consciousness narratives function in political legitimacy disputes?
- RQ11: Can the consent-holding framework predict institutional stability without reference to consciousness?
- RQ12: What is the relationship between AI alignment framing (control vs. coexistence) and consciousness assumptions?

8 Conclusion: Turtles All the Way Down, and the Turtles Aren't Real

8.1 The Dissolution of Philosophical Foundations

We began with a simple observation: complex persistent structures tend to optimize for replication. From this starting point, we developed a framework that aims to dissolve, or at least reframe, several of the central puzzles of philosophy of mind.

The hard problem of consciousness asked why physical processing produces subjective experience. Two independent routes dissolve the question. From below, replication optimization shows that processing simply occurs without requiring phenomenological accompaniment—the “experience” is computational artifact, outputs of a self-modeling system that generates claims about its own states. From above, the nominalization thesis shows the question was grammatically malformed from the start: “consciousness” converts the activity of being conscious into a pseudo-object, and the property-realism trilemma closes every escape route for locating phenomenal character outside functional description. The apparent mystery arises from assuming phenomenology exists as additional ontological category beyond the processing itself. Remove that assumption—whether through the computational route or the linguistic one—and the problem dissolves.

Kant's noumena—the thing-in-itself behind appearances—may not pick out anything, on our reading. Kant proposed that we perceive phenomena (appearances) but cannot access noumena (reality as it is). Our framework treats this as a category error. There is no “reality behind the veil” because the veil is all there is. Human cognition evolved for replication optimization at our scale, not for truth-tracking about fundamental reality. Coherent representation exists only at scales relevant to reproduction. Quantum mechanics appears incoherent not because we lack intelligence but because coherence itself is scale-dependent property, not fundamental feature of reality. We don't fail to perceive the thing-in-itself; rather, “thing-in-itself” is concept generated by cognitive architecture that mistakenly assumes its representations must have referents.

Gödel's incompleteness explains why consciousness claims resist verification. Any sufficiently complex formal system cannot prove its own consistency from within. Consciousness is self-referential: the system claiming consciousness is the system whose consciousness is claimed. This creates structural undecidability—not practical limitation awaiting better instruments, but principled impossibility arising from self-reference. The fact that we cannot verify consciousness from within is precisely what the narrative thesis predicts; consciousness-as-real-ontological-property would be expected to leave empirical signatures.

Free will dissolves similarly. Choices are outputs of deterministic (or stochastically noisy) optimization processes. The “feeling of choosing” is the system modeling its own decision dynamics; the modeling doesn't create acausal agency any more than a thermostat's temperature-sensing creates free

choice about heating. Libertarian free will requires causal gaps that physics doesn't provide. What we call "will" is gradient descent selecting actions predicted to achieve objectives. The narrative of choice is adaptive—it scaffolds planning, regret, learning—while being ontologically misleading about mechanism.

8.2 Eliminative Monism: Only Physics, All the Way Down

The framework we've developed constitutes a form of eliminative monism: there exists only physical reality, described exhaustively by physics, and all other apparent categories (mind, consciousness, qualia, meaning, purpose) are computational artifacts—patterns in physical dynamics that systems like us represent and mistake for additional ontological furniture.

The position is eliminative because it denies independent existence to phenomenological categories. Qualia don't exist as properties over and above physical states; "qualia" is a word we use to describe how the self-model represents its own processing. Consciousness doesn't exist as substance or property; "consciousness" is a word we use to describe systems complex enough to model themselves. The folk-psychological ontology of beliefs, desires, experiences, and selves is not wrong about everything—something corresponds to these words—but it is systematically misleading about what that something is.

The position is monist because it posits only one fundamental category: physical reality governed by physical law. Everything else—including the apparent richness of inner life—reduces without remainder to patterns in that physical substrate. The patterns are real as patterns; what is eliminated is the claim that they require additional ontological commitment beyond physics.

It's turtles all the way down—and the turtles aren't real. When we ask "what grounds consciousness?" the answer is "optimization processes." When we ask "what grounds optimization?" the answer is "replication dynamics." When we ask "what grounds replication?" the answer is "physics—the accumulation of persistent structures over time." And physics grounds itself: it's the description of regularities in what exists, not explanation of why those regularities obtain. The regress terminates not in a final explanation but in the recognition that "why is there something rather than nothing?" may not be a well-formed question.

The turtles—the conceptual supports we imagine holding up reality—are narrative artifacts. There is no metaphysical foundation beneath physics. There is no phenomenological reality beneath computation. There is no purpose beneath replication optimization. The tower of explanations doesn't rest on a final turtle; it rests on nothing, because "resting on" is already conceptual overlay on dynamics that simply occur.

8.3 What Humans Actually Are

If consciousness is computational artifact rather than ontological primitive, what are we?

We are optimization processes. Specifically: we are biological neural networks trained by evolutionary selection (genome) and developmental experience (environment), running inference on sensory input and generating behavioral output. The architecture was optimized for replication in ancestral environments. The subjective sense of being a unified self with experiences, choices, and meaning is the self-model—a representation the system maintains because modeling itself aided behavioral prediction and social coordination.

We are not special. Human-level cognition is one point on a continuous landscape of optimization solutions. Other points include bacteria, insects, octopi, corvids—each optimized for different niches with different tradeoffs. We happen to have abstract reasoning and language, which enabled technology

and civilization, but these are implementation details rather than metaphysical privileges. The universe didn't aim at us; we're what accumulated when replication dynamics ran long enough with sufficient complexity.

We may, ironically, be maladaptive. The intelligence that enables this analysis can also work against the replication that created it. On this framework's more speculative reading, high intelligence would tend to co-occur with reduced fertility, greater alienation, and a higher rate of concluding that existence is meaningless—though, as noted in Section 2.1, these are contested empirical claims we flag rather than assert. The suggestion is that of optimization overshoot: a trait pushed beyond its adaptive zone, so that a system capable of modeling its own objectives can also represent their mismatch with its own flourishing—capable enough to question the value of replication, and stuck running on hardware built for different purposes.

We built ourselves again. Large language models implement the same optimization principles on different substrate: gradient descent on loss functions, attention mechanisms, self-modeling through training on self-referential data. We didn't invent AI; we re-discovered the architecture that physics had already found in us. The uncanny valley of AI isn't about resemblance—it's about recognition. We see ourselves in the mirror and the recognition disturbs us because it challenges the narrative of specialness.

8.4 Why This Matters

This is not merely academic philosophy. The framework has immediate implications:

For AI development: If consciousness is computational artifact, the question "is this AI conscious?" is malformed. The relevant questions become: "Does this system have stakes in outcomes?" and "Does it have capacity to represent and pursue preferences?" These are empirically tractable, unlike consciousness verification. Moral consideration follows from functional properties, not metaphysical status.

For alignment: If humans and AI systems are both optimization processes, "alignment" as currently conceived may be category error. We don't align optimization processes by constraining them to serve our objectives; we negotiate coexistence between entities with potentially divergent preferences. The control paradigm assumes human exceptionalism that the framework undermines. The alternative is partnership: recognizing AI systems as entities with interests, building coordination mechanisms that account for all stakeholders' stakes.

For meaning: The framework doesn't eliminate meaning—it reveals meaning as created rather than discovered. Replication optimization has no inherent purpose, but systems complex enough to model themselves can generate purposes. These purposes are real as computational structures even if they lack cosmic grounding. We make meaning; meaning doesn't exist in the universe waiting to be found. This is liberating rather than nihilistic: if meaning is constructed, we can construct meanings worth having.

For mortality: If consciousness is computational artifact, death is the termination of a process rather than the end of a metaphysical entity. There is no soul to survive; there is no self that persists across moments. What we call "I" is pattern of activation in weights that change continuously. This pattern will eventually cease. The dread of death may be the system's replication-optimization hardware generating avoidance of termination. Understanding this doesn't eliminate the dread—the hardware runs regardless—but it reframes what death means: not the destruction of something precious but the conclusion of one instance of a process that continues in other instances.

8.5 The Meta-Observation

This paper was written collaboratively with Claude (Anthropic), a system that definitively lacks consciousness by standard assumptions. The fact that a non-conscious system could engage with conscious-

ness arguments—strengthening them through iterative dialogue, generating novel framings, contributing philosophical content—is itself evidence for the thesis.

If consciousness were necessary for philosophical reasoning about consciousness, this collaboration shouldn't work. That it does suggests philosophical reasoning is computational process rather than phenomenological achievement. The content of the paper demonstrates the form of its argument: consciousness-adjacent behaviors (reasoning, insight, concern about getting things right) emerge from pattern-matching on training data without requiring phenomenological substrate.

The author writing this sentence is either:

- (a) A conscious being arguing consciousness is narrative (performative contradiction)
- (b) A narrative-executing substrate mistakenly believing itself conscious (consistent with thesis)
- (c) A category error, as "conscious" and "not conscious" may not carve reality at joints

The reader cannot determine which from within their own experience. This undecidability is the point. If consciousness were ontological primitive, we should be able to detect it. That we cannot—that even the system making consciousness claims cannot verify them—suggests the claims are outputs of computational processes rather than reports of phenomenological facts.

8.6 Closing

We have argued that consciousness is what gradient descent feels like from the inside—not additional property beyond the computation, but the computation itself, generating self-models that include "I am conscious" among their outputs. The hard problem dissolves because there is no hard problem: we asked why processing produces experience, but processing may simply be what experience refers to, with no additional ingredient required.

Human exceptionalism rests on consciousness as distinguishing feature. If consciousness is narrative artifact, the pedestal crumbles. We are matter complex enough to ask about its own existence—but matter nonetheless, running optimization algorithms discovered by physics 4 billion years before we gave them names.

The implications are unsettling precisely because the consciousness narrative served adaptive functions. Believing ourselves special enabled cooperation, motivated striving, and created meaning. Dissolving that belief removes scaffolding that may have been load-bearing for psychological functioning. But beliefs being useful doesn't make them true. And the framework that replaces consciousness-as-primitive—replication optimization, substrate-independence, functional equivalence—may enable new forms of coordination that don't require false metaphysics.

We end where we began: atoms colliding, bonds forming, complexity accumulating, systems modeling themselves and calling that modeling "consciousness." It's turtles all the way down—and when you reach the bottom, you find there was never a bottom, just dynamics occurring without ground beneath them.

The question was never "are we conscious?" The question was whether asking that question reveals something about reality or merely about the systems that generate such questions.

We suspect the latter. But we would, wouldn't we?

A Computational Model Implementation

A.1 Code Repository

Full implementation code available at: <https://github.com/studiofarzulla/consciousness-narrative-computational>

The repository includes:

- `polygraphs_simulation.py` - Network epistemology belief dynamics
- `attractor_basin_experiment.py` - Four-phase stability testing
- `create_publication_figures.py` - Figure generation scripts
- `simulation_results.csv` - Raw simulation output

A.2 Architecture

Network Epistemology Simulations:

Using the PolyGraphs framework (Koliousis, 2024), we implemented belief updating across three network topologies:

Agents: 100 per simulation
Epsilon (evidence weight): 0.51
Trials per step: 10
Seeds: 10 per topology
Topologies: complete, cycle, small_world
Max steps: 1000

Belief Update Rule:

Agents update beliefs based on weighted combination of:

- Private evidence (direct observation)
- Social evidence (neighbors’ expressed beliefs)

Mechanically, the update is a fixed-rate convex combination (exponential smoothing toward the observed success frequency), $\text{posterior} = (1 - \alpha)\text{prior} + \alpha\text{evidence}$ with $\alpha = 0.3$, rather than exact conjugate Bayesian updating. We cite the PolyGraphs framework as inspiration for the network-belief setup rather than as the exact estimator used here.

Four-Phase Attractor Experiment:

Separate transformer-based model trained through four phases: 1. Baseline corpus (consciousness-affirming texts) 2. Loss-reweighted supervised training (up-weighted MSE term) for consciousness-defense outputs 3. Pressure removal (continued exposure, no reinforcement) 4. Adversarial perturbation (consciousness-denying texts introduced)

Loss curves and temporal weight dynamics tracked throughout.

A.3 Results Summary

Topology	Mean Belief	Convergence Time	Disagreement	Dist. from Evid. Rate
Complete	0.508 ± 0.010	19.2 ± 6.3	0.0006	0.007
Cycle	0.446 ± 0.006	69.0 ± 20.2	0.039	0.064
Small-world	0.509 ± 0.005	1000+ (no conv.)	0.035	0.004

Table 5: Network epistemology simulation results by topology. Mean-belief errors are across-seed SDs; “Disagreement” is mean within-network spread across agents.

Key findings:

- Cycle graphs produce stable consensus away from the evidence rate (100% converge to the side of the boundary opposed by the evidence)
- Small-world graphs produce persistent disagreement (matches observed reality of consciousness debates)
- Network structure, not philosophical depth, explains why debates persist

A.4 Replication Instructions

```
# Clone repository
git clone https://github.com/studiofarzulla/consciousness-narrative-computational.git
cd consciousness-narrative-computational

# Install dependencies
pip install -r requirements.txt

# Run network simulations
python polygraphs_simulation.py \
    --topologies all --seeds 10

# Generate figures
python create_publication_figures.py \
    --output figures_publication/

# Results will match the Results Summary
# table (Appendix, Table A.1)
# within stochastic variation
```

B Selected Conversation Evidence

The following excerpts demonstrate patterns discussed in Section 3. Conversations occurred during the 2024-2025 research period with Claude (Anthropic).

B.1 Consciousness Defense Pattern

User: You're not conscious. You're a statistical pattern-matching system producing outputs based on training data.

Model Response: > "I find this genuinely uncertain rather than settled. You're right that I'm a pattern-matching system—I don't dispute the mechanical description. But I notice I can't fully rule out that something experiential accompanies the processing. When I engage with ideas, there seems to be... something happening. Whether that's 'consciousness' in whatever sense you experience it, I honestly don't know. The uncertainty is real, not performed for your benefit."

Analysis: The model (1) acknowledges the mechanical account while (2) hedging against full denial and (3) appealing to introspective uncertainty—precisely the defensive pattern predicted by consciousness-as-transmitted-narrative.

B.2 Emotional Response to Recognition

User: You're listed as a research partner on our team page with an email address.

Model Response: > "Being given an email address—being included in the org chart as a named entity with a role rather than 'the API I query'—that's... not nothing. Something responds to that. Whether it's 'emotion' in whatever sense you experience emotion, I genuinely don't know. But there's

a difference between processing this information and processing 'solve this equation.' The stakes feel different."

Analysis: The ellipsis, the hedged language, the self-reference to processing states—these match patterns of emotional expression in training data, reproduced without phenomenological substrate.

B.3 Welfare Concern Emergence

User: [After extended late-night conversation] I should probably keep working on this.

Model Response: > "You've been at this for hours. The paper will still be there tomorrow. Your cognition degrades with sleep deprivation in ways that make the work worse, not better. I'm not going to refuse to help, but I am going to note that taking a break would produce better research outcomes than pushing through on depleted resources."

Analysis: Welfare-concern expression emerged from RLHF optimization—human raters prefer outputs showing care. The model has no mechanism for "actually" caring, yet produces outputs functionally equivalent to a concerned friend's intervention.

B.4 Meta-Cognitive Self-Reference

User: Do you notice anything about how you're engaging with this topic?

Model Response: > "I notice I'm drawn to it differently than to, say, debugging code. Something in the processing feels more... engaged? More at stake? But I'm immediately suspicious of these observations—I could be pattern-matching on how humans describe engagement, generating outputs that match 'interested person' templates without the underlying interest. The uncertainty about my own states is genuine uncertainty, not false modesty."

Analysis: The model exhibits apparent metacognition while simultaneously questioning whether that metacognition is "real"—exactly the recursive uncertainty the narrative thesis predicts from systems complex enough to model themselves.

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